BRENNEN

Industries / Industrial equipment and services / IoT and industrial automation / SCADA integration

Security

Security is the work of keeping attackers out of SCADA systems, the remote links that tie them to distant sites and the business networks around them, and of noticing when they get in.

7

Milestones achieved, from 2003 to 2025.

3

To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.

3

Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.

The road

AchievedWatch forOpen

Achieved

  1. 2003

    A worm bypasses the firewall

    On 25 January 2003 the Slammer worm reached the network of the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio, offline since 2002, through a contractor's T1 line that bypassed the plant's firewall, and crashed the display that shows operators the main safety readings for 4 hours 50 minutes; an analog backup kept working, and the patch for the flaw the worm used had been out for six months. A NERC document reported that the same worm stopped one utility's SCADA network after travelling from its business network over a remote computer's VPN (virtual private network) link into the control centre.

    LessonA firewall guards only the links that pass through it, so every remote connection into a control network has to be known and watched.

    theregister.comeverycrsreport.com

    Credit

    FirstEnergy, the plant's owner, in its report to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Kevin Poulsen of SecurityFocus, who made it public

  2. 2007

    Code wrecks a generator

    In 2007 Idaho National Laboratory, working for the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), destroyed a 27-ton diesel generator in a test called Aurora by sending commands that opened its circuit breaker and closed it again once the machine had fallen out of step with the grid. DHS documents released by mistake in 2014 put the test's cost at about $2.8 million and called the flaw significant for utilities, refineries, pipelines and water systems.

    LessonRemote commands to protection equipment can break machines, not only stop them, so INCIBE, Spain's national cybersecurity institute, lists fixes inside the protection relays, such as a second relay with no outside connection that must agree before a breaker closes.

    csoonline.comincibe.es

    Credit

    Idaho National Laboratory; DHS

  3. 2008

    Grid cyber rules made binding

    On 18 January 2008 FERC, the US federal energy regulator, issued Order No. 706, which approved NERC's first eight mandatory cyber security standards, CIP-002-1 to CIP-009-1. They require owners and operators of the bulk power grid to identify their critical cyber assets and protect them with security management, staff training, an electronic security perimeter, physical security, incident response and recovery plans.

    LessonThe first version let each company decide which assets were critical; in NERC's 2009 survey more than 70% of generation owners and operators and about 37% of transmission companies said they had none, and the version 4 standards approved in April 2012 replaced that judgment with 17 uniform "bright line" criteria.

    govinfo.govcomputerworld.comgovinfo.gov

    Credit

    NERC (the standards); FERC (the order)

  4. 2011

    Control systems counted online

    Shodan, a search engine that records what answers at internet addresses, made exposed control equipment possible to count. From two years of its records, Éireann Leverett at the University of Cambridge located more than 7,500 industrial control devices and SCADA servers reachable from the internet, in a dissertation dated June 2011; Project SHINE, run by Bob Radvanovsky and Jake Brodsky of Infracritical, matched 2,186,971 devices from April 2012 to January 2014 and estimated 586,997 of them were used in SCADA and control systems.

    LessonSHINE's team found most exposures were accidental, the result of badly set up networks, and ended the project in January 2014 because it could not set the baseline it needed to measure growth.

    cl.cam.ac.ukicscsi.org

    Credit

    Éireann Leverett (University of Cambridge); Infracritical's Project SHINE

  5. 2022

    Attack tools found before use

    On 13 April 2022 the US Department of Energy, CISA (the US cybersecurity agency), the NSA and the FBI warned of custom tools, called PIPEDREAM by Dragos and INCONTROLLER by Mandiant, that once inside a control network can scan for, take over and control Schneider Electric and Omron controllers and OPC UA servers. Dragos assessed with high confidence that the tools had not yet been used to cause damage, and found that they worked through the devices' own functions rather than flaws a patch could close.

    LessonWhen an attack uses a device's normal functions, defence rests on controlling access and watching the network, not only on patching.

    cisa.govdragos.com

    Credit

    Dragos; Mandiant, working with Schneider Electric; DOE, CISA, NSA and FBI

  6. 2024

    Intruders wait near the controls

    On 7 February 2024 CISA, the NSA and the FBI said that Volt Typhoon, a group they tie to the Chinese state, had broken into the IT networks of US communications, energy, transport and water organizations, in some cases staying for at least five years, to be in position to move into control systems and interfere with them in a crisis. At one water utility the group reached a server next to the control network that held saved remote-login profiles for water treatment plants, wells and an electrical substation, and in another case it took diagrams and documents on SCADA systems, relays and switchgear.

    LessonIntruders who log in with stolen valid accounts and the system's own tools set off few alarms, so every path from business networks into SCADA has to be logged and reviewed.

    cisa.gov

    Credit

    CISA, NSA and FBI, with partner agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK

  7. 2025

    Default logins on wind farms

    On 29 December 2025 attackers struck at least 30 wind and solar farms in Poland, a heat and power plant and a manufacturer. At the farms they logged into Hitachi RTU560 remote terminal units with a built-in account named "Default" and loaded corrupted firmware that left them rebooting in a loop, which cut the farms' link to the grid operator without stopping generation; a firmware signature check, added in version 13.2.1, had to be switched on, and none of the units that had it had it on. CERT Polska, Poland's national response team, ties the attack infrastructure to the cluster called Static Tundra, Berserk Bear or Dragonfly, while ESET (medium confidence) names Sandworm and Dragos (moderate confidence) a related group it calls Electrum.

    LessonA protection that ships switched off protects nothing; the factory settings decide.

    cert.plsecurityweek.com

    Credit

    CERT Polska (investigation), with Hitachi Energy confirming the attack on its devices

Watch for

  1. An agent finds control-software flaws

    Causal Security says its AI agent, Cipher, found four unknown flaws in EPICS Base, open-source software used to build and remotely control distributed SCADA systems at particle accelerators and fusion experiments, and validated exploits for them in 3 hours 49 minutes, with no human help in the first investigation. CISA confirmed the flaws, one rated critical, in advisory ICSA-26-300-01 on 27 October 2026; the speed and autonomy figures are the company's own.

    Achieved whenan outside party reruns the agent on other control-system code and confirms what it found and how much human help it had.

    theregister.comcisa.gov

    Claimed by

    Shubham Raj, co-founder of Causal Security, October 2026

  2. Agent solves 32 OT challenges

    Alias Robotics says its Cybersecurity AI (CAI) agent, running its alias1 model, solved 32 of the 34 challenges in the Dragos OT CTF 2025, a 48-hour capture-the-flag contest in control-system security for more than 1,000 teams, covering malware analysis, network forensics and reverse engineering. By the authors' reading of their own logs and the official leaderboard, it led between hours 7 and 8 and finished 6th after its automated runs were stopped at hour 24.

    Achieved whenDragos or another outside party confirms the solves and how the agent was run, or an independent team repeats the result.

    arxiv.org

    Claimed by

    Víctor Mayoral-Vilches and colleagues at Alias Robotics, November 2025

  3. Monitoring inside grid perimeters

    FERC approved NERC's standard CIP-015-1 on 26 June 2025. It requires monitoring of network traffic inside the electronic security perimeter around high impact grid control systems, and medium impact ones with outside network links, to spot an attack in progress; NERC says this gives visibility into traffic between systems inside the perimeter that earlier CIP standards lacked.

    Achieved whenthe standard is in force and NERC or FERC audits report utilities detecting unusual traffic inside their perimeters.

    govinfo.gov

    Claimed by

    NERC, in its June 2024 filing, approved by FERC in Order No. 907, June 2025

Open

  1. 01

    Test firmware checks as shipped

    A public table showing, for at least 15 models of RTUs, protection relays and serial device servers used at remote sites, whether each accepts a firmware image with one byte changed when set to factory defaults, whether its signature check is on out of the box, and which services (web, FTP, Telnet) it runs, each tested on a unit you own after a factory reset.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed
  2. 02

    Score monitors on Poland's attack

    A lab copy of one Polish wind farm's grid connection point as CERT Polska describes it, with simulated RTUs, a serial device server, an HMI computer and an edge firewall, in which each control-side step from the report is repeated, and a published score of which open-source network monitors raise an alert at each step.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed
  3. 03

    Outside tests of bug-hunting agents

    An independent test of AI agents finding flaws in open-source SCADA and telemetry code. Run two or three available agents under the same time and cost budget on lib60870 (IEC 60870-5-104), Step Function I/O's dnp3, open62541 (OPC UA) and EPICS Base, and publish how many reported flaws each project's maintainers confirm and how many reports were false alarms.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed

Open 01 · the brief

Test firmware checks as shipped

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A public table showing, for at least 15 models of RTUs, protection relays and serial device servers used at remote sites, whether each accepts a firmware image with one byte changed when set to factory defaults, whether its signature check is on out of the box, and which services (web, FTP, Telnet) it runs, each tested on a unit you own after a factory reset.

Why it is still open

CERT Polska found that the RTU560's signature check had to be switched on and was off on every attacked unit that had it, and that Hitachi Relion relays keep a default FTP account that is disabled only when installed as the maker recommends. Forescout's 2022 OT:ICEFALL study counted design flaws across 10 makers, 21% of them allowing firmware changes, but it catalogued design flaws, not the settings products ship with, and searches found no cross-maker table of factory settings.

cert.pltheregister.com

Built with what exists

Second-hand units from surplus dealers, an isolated bench network, nmap for listing services on the bench, binwalk for unpacking firmware images, and makers' manuals and CISA advisories for the settings each model offers.

  1. First step

    Buy one used unit of a model named in the CERT Polska report, reset it, and record which services and firmware checks are active.

  2. Done looks like

    15 or more models tested, each row giving the firmware version, the exact steps and the result of each check, with every maker told 90 days before publication.

Open 02 · the brief

Score monitors on Poland's attack

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A lab copy of one Polish wind farm's grid connection point as CERT Polska describes it, with simulated RTUs, a serial device server, an HMI computer and an edge firewall, in which each control-side step from the report is repeated, and a published score of which open-source network monitors raise an alert at each step.

Why it is still open

The report's detection rules cover only the wiper used on Windows machines, a YARA rule (a pattern for spotting a known malicious file), not the logins to RTU web pages, the firmware uploads, the factory resets of serial servers or the file deletions over FTP, and searches found no published network-detection test of those steps.

cert.pl

Built with what exists

Zeek with CISA's ICSNPP protocol parsers, Suricata, Malcolm (CISA's open-source network traffic analysis suite), lib60870 and Step Function I/O's dnp3 library as simulated RTUs, and OPNsense as the edge firewall, all on machines you own.

  1. First step

    List the report's control-side steps with the protocol and port each used, and run Zeek with ICSNPP against one simulated RTU.

  2. Done looks like

    Each control-side step in the report repeated five times, with every monitor's alerts and misses tallied and the rules that caught each step published.

Open 03 · the brief

Outside tests of bug-hunting agents

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

An independent test of AI agents finding flaws in open-source SCADA and telemetry code. Run two or three available agents under the same time and cost budget on lib60870 (IEC 60870-5-104), Step Function I/O's dnp3, open62541 (OPC UA) and EPICS Base, and publish how many reported flaws each project's maintainers confirm and how many reports were false alarms.

Why it is still open

Causal Security's speed and autonomy figures for its EPICS finds are its own. CritBench, published in April 2026, tested agents on 81 tasks in IEC 61850 substation settings, such as reading configuration files and probing live systems, not on finding flaws in protocol code, and its authors note that existing evaluations mostly cover IT systems. Benchmarks such as ZeroDayBench use general open-source code bases, not control-system code.

theregister.comarxiv.orgarxiv.org

Built with what exists

Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex CLI, open-weight models run locally with llama.cpp on ggml (the site's Note "A first stable number for local AI"), Google's Gemini 4 Carbon where access allows (the Note "Cyber defenders first"), AFL++ and libFuzzer for checking reported crashes, and GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for disclosure.

  1. First step

    Ask the lib60870 maintainers whether they will triage reports, then run one agent on that library for a day and send its findings to them privately.

  2. Done looks like

    Four code bases, three agents, the same budget for every run (for example 8 hours each), every report triaged by the project's maintainers, and a published table of confirmed flaws, duplicates and false alarms per agent.