BRENNEN

Industries / Mining and materials / Chemicals and petrochemicals / Refining

Process safety

Process safety is the work of keeping flammable and toxic material inside a refinery's pipes and vessels, so that it does not leak, burn or explode.

6

Milestones achieved, from 1966 to 2021.

1

To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.

2

Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.

The road

AchievedWatch forOpen

Achieved

  1. 1966

    Spheres burst at Feyzin

    On 4 January 1966 an operator at the Feyzin refinery near Lyon, France, was draining water from a propane storage sphere when a blockage of ice cleared and the drain valves froze open. A car about 160 m away ignited the propane cloud, and about 90 minutes after the leak began the sphere burst and its fragments knocked down the next sphere. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) says 18 people died and 81 were injured, and that insulation, fixed water sprays and stronger legs on storage spheres entered codes of practice after the accident.

    LessonA tank of liquefied gas needs a drain that can be shut from a distance, because a valve can freeze open.

    hse.gov.ukicheme.org

    Credit

    lessons compiled by the HSE and by IChemE's Lessons Learned Database, which lists the French ARIA accident record for Feyzin as No. 1

  2. 2010

    Hydrogen weakens old steel

    On 2 April 2010 a heat exchanger almost 40 years old burst at Tesoro's refinery in Anacortes, Washington, during a job to switch flow between two banks of exchangers, and seven workers died. The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) found high-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA), in which hydrogen at high heat and pressure reacts with the carbon in steel and cracks it from inside. Refiners choose steels using API RP 941, whose "Nelson curves" mark the safe limits of temperature and hydrogen pressure for each steel. The American Petroleum Institute's (API) eighth edition of February 2016 added a separate curve for carbon steel not heat-treated after welding, but the CSB found that HTHA at Tesoro had occurred below the new line, and closed its recommendation as "unacceptable action".

    LessonA safe limit drawn from reported failures can sit above damage that nobody has reported yet.

    csb.govcsb.gov

    Credit

    CSB investigation, final report May 2014; API

  3. 2011

    One count for refineries

    After the 2005 explosion at BP's Texas City refinery, the CSB asked API and the steelworkers' union in 2007 to write a national standard of process safety indicators for public reporting. The result, API RP 754, sorts releases of material into tiers, with Tier 1 for the most serious. API's public figures for US refineries begin with 2011. For 2025 it reports 96 Tier 1 events at 94 refineries, and says the five-year average rate fell 33% from 2012 and has since leveled off. In 2012 the CSB found the Tier 1 and 2 counts likely too few to judge single sites, and the drafting committee too heavily weighted toward industry after the union withdrew.

    api.orgcsb.govcsb.gov

    Credit

    API, at the CSB's recommendation

  4. 2017

    California rewrites refinery rules

    In August 2012 a corroded pipe failed at Chevron's Richmond refinery. The CSB found the cause was sulfidation, a corrosion that thins pipe walls over time, and asked California to require a documented search for inherently safer designs, which remove a hazard instead of guarding against it. California's refinery process safety rule, Title 8 section 5189.1, took effect on 1 October 2017. It requires a damage mechanism review of how each unit's equipment can corrode or crack, repeated at least every five years; an analysis that ranks safeguards with inherent safety first; and that fixes needing a shutdown be made at the unit's first scheduled turnaround.

    dir.ca.govcsb.gov

    Credit

    the State of California, following the CSB's Richmond recommendation

  5. 2019

    A thin elbow, then closure

    On 21 June 2019 a pipe elbow ruptured in the alkylation unit at Philadelphia Energy Solutions, then the largest refinery on the US East Coast. Alkylation joins small gas molecules into a high-octane part of gasoline, using sulfuric acid or hydrofluoric acid (HF) as the catalyst; HF is highly toxic and turns to vapor in open air. The propane cloud ignited, a vessel burst, and a fragment of about 38,000 pounds (17 tonnes) flew across the Schuylkill River. The company estimated that 5,239 pounds (2.4 tonnes) of HF were released, 3,271 pounds of it beyond the reach of the water sprays. The elbow, installed around 1973, held more nickel and copper than the pipe beside it, which made it corrode faster in HF. Five days later the company said it would close the refinery, which was later sold and demolished. API then revised RP 751 to require inspection of every carbon steel pipe part in HF corrosion zones.

    LessonMeasuring a pipe at a few sample points can miss the one fitting made of a steel that corrodes faster.

    csb.govcsb.gov

    Credit

    CSB investigation, report October 2022; API

  6. 2021

    Alkylation without HF

    Chevron converted the 4,500 barrel-a-day HF alkylation unit at its Salt Lake City refinery to ISOALKY, which uses an ionic liquid, a salt that is liquid at low temperature, as the catalyst. The Chemical Engineer reported the unit in operation in 2021, after five years in a small demonstration unit; Honeywell UOP says the catalyst has negligible vapor pressure, so it does not form a vapor cloud. The CSB wrote in 2022 that the unit is operating at commercial scale. In China, a composite ionic liquid process from China University of Petroleum had earlier been used to retrofit a PetroChina sulfuric acid unit and to build a 2,000 barrel-a-day unit at Deyang Chemical, commissioned in 2013, according to Oil & Gas Journal.

    thechemicalengineer.comcsb.govogj.com

    Credit

    Chevron and Honeywell UOP; China University of Petroleum (Beijing)

Watch for

  1. HF rule may be withdrawn

    The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to drop its 2024 requirement that refineries with HF alkylation study safer alternatives and put at least one in place. EPA says most of the 43 affected refineries manage the risk well, noting that six of them account for 89% of the monetized accident costs at those sites from 2014 to 2023, and it cites estimates of up to US$900 million to replace an HF unit.

    Achieved whenEPA publishes a final rule, and someone outside EPA analyzes the same accident records and confirms that most HF alkylation sites have low accident rates.

    federalregister.gov

    Claimed by

    US EPA, February 2026

Open

  1. 01

    Check the industry's own count

    A public, refinery-by-refinery list of every release at US refineries for one year, drawn from government records, with each release sorted by the Tier 1 and Tier 2 rules of API RP 754, and a national total set beside the industry's own figure.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed
  2. 02

    Recount the startup share

    A public count of refinery accidents by operating mode (normal running, startup, shutdown, standby or maintenance), drawn from published investigation records, to test the often-repeated figure that about half of process safety incidents happen during startups, shutdowns and other infrequent events.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed

Open 01 · the brief

Check the industry's own count

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A public, refinery-by-refinery list of every release at US refineries for one year, drawn from government records, with each release sorted by the Tier 1 and Tier 2 rules of API RP 754, and a national total set beside the industry's own figure.

Why it is still open

API publishes only an industry total built from companies' own reports: 96 Tier 1 events at 94 refineries in 2025. In 2012 the CSB found such counts likely too few to judge single sites, and the definitions likely to miss a sizable number of warning events. For EPA, the contractor ERG counted the flaring and other incidents that 12 refineries reported under their consent decrees from 2016 to 2020, to compare Suncor's Commerce City refinery with the others, but did not sort them into API's tiers. Searches found no independent count of Tier 1 events built from public records.

api.orgcsb.govepa.gov

Built with what exists

The National Response Center's yearly spreadsheets of spill and release reports, which it labels as initial reports not checked by any agency; EIA's annual Refinery Capacity Report to match addresses to refineries; state records such as Texas emission event reports; a language model that reads each report, applies the RP 754 thresholds and quotes the sentence behind each decision (see the Note "Findings that cite notes"); two people who check a sample.

nrc.uscg.mil

  1. First step

    Download the 2025 spreadsheet, keep the reports from refinery addresses, and classify 50 of them by hand.

  2. Done looks like

    Every National Response Center report from US refineries for one year classified, two people agreeing with the model on at least 90% of a random 200, and the estimated national Tier 1 count published beside API's figure with the reasons for any gap.

Open 02 · the brief

Recount the startup share

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A public count of refinery accidents by operating mode (normal running, startup, shutdown, standby or maintenance), drawn from published investigation records, to test the often-repeated figure that about half of process safety incidents happen during startups, shutdowns and other infrequent events.

Why it is still open

The CSB's safety digest on startups and shutdowns quotes a 2010 study for the 50% figure, and the CCPS for incidents being five times more frequent during startup. The CSB's Husky report traces the half figure to studies by I. M. Duguid; Duguid's 2008 paper analyzes a private database of 1,000 incidents across the process industries, finds 45% occurred when the plant was not in normal operation, and says the source article is available from the author. France's accident analysis office, BARPI, reviewed accidents during startup, restart and shutdown in a 2020 bulletin and found mostly organizational causes, but gave no share. Searches found no recent public recount for refineries.

csb.govicheme.orgaria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr

Built with what exists

CSB investigation reports; the European Commission's eMARS major accident reports; France's ARIA accident database; a language model that tags each report's operating mode and quotes the sentence it relied on (see the Note "Findings that cite notes"); two people who check the tags.

  1. First step

    Tag by hand the operating mode of every refinery accident on the CSB's list of completed investigations.

  2. Done looks like

    At least 300 refinery accidents from 1990 to 2025 tagged by operating mode, two people agreeing on 90% of a random sample, and the share in each mode published with a confidence range beside the 50% figure.