Industries / Energy, water and waste / Pipelines and midstream / LNG
Safety
Safety work keeps LNG and its vapor from catching fire or exploding, by keeping plants at a distance from people, designing equipment to hold leaks, testing how spills behave and learning from accidents.
7
Milestones achieved, from 1973 to 2022.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1973
Fire inside an empty tank
On 10 February 1973 a fire started inside an emptied LNG storage tank on Staten Island, New York, while workers were repairing its insulating liner. Pressure lifted the tank's concrete roof, which then fell in on them. FERC's account gives 37 workers killed; most other accounts give 40. The tank belonged to Texas Eastern Transmission, and New York State then put a moratorium on LNG storage.
Lessoninvestigators found pockets of gas in a tank drained ten months before.
Credit
Texas Eastern Transmission (owner); New York City Fire Department and US Department of Labor (investigators)
1979
Vapor through a conduit
On 6 October 1979 LNG leaked past an inadequately tightened pump seal at the Cove Point import terminal in Maryland, turned to vapor and traveled about 210 feet (64 m) through an underground electrical conduit into a substation building, where the arcing contacts of a circuit breaker ignited it. One worker was killed and one badly hurt, and damage came to about $3 million. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also faulted the lack of any combustible gas detector in the building.
Lessonvapor follows pipes and cable ducts into rooms where no one expects gas.
Credit
Columbia LNG Corporation (operator); NTSB (investigation, report PAR-80-2)
1980
Federal siting rules
The US Department of Transportation issued 49 CFR Part 193, federal safety standards for LNG plants, on 11 February 1980. Today each LNG container and transfer system must have an exclusion zone for flammable vapor, sized under the NFPA 59A standard, with distances worked out by an approved computer model such as DEGADIS.
Credit
Materials Transportation Bureau of the US Department of Transportation, a predecessor of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
2004
The Skikda explosion
On 19 January 2004 a steam boiler at Sonatrach's LNG plant in Skikda, Algeria, exploded and set off a much larger vapor cloud explosion that destroyed three of the plant's six liquefaction trains and its offices. IChemE's lessons database records 27 dead and 74 injured; FERC's account gave 56 injured. The likely cause was refrigerant or LNG leaking from a cold box, a block of heat exchangers, and drawn into the boiler's air intake.
Lessonspace boilers, offices and process units apart, and enforce minimum distances to homes.
Credit
Sonatrach (operator); IChemE (lessons-learned summary)
2009
Fires the size of spills
Congress funded the Department of Energy in 2008 to test LNG fires far larger than earlier experiments. In 2009 Sandia National Laboratories spilled LNG onto a 120 m pond in New Mexico and burned pools about 21 m and 83 m across; the larger fire's flames reached about 146 m. Little smoke formed, and the flame surface gave off an average 286 kW per m², the value Sandia suggests for hazard estimates near pools about 100 m across. The flame also clung to objects standing in the fire, which suggests a ship would hold the fire in place.
Lessona large LNG fire may not shield itself with smoke, so heat estimates near it should not count on that.
Credit
Sandia National Laboratories (Richard Simpson, Anay Luketa and colleagues), for the US Department of Energy
2022
Fire models get a test
Sandia National Laboratories published a database of measured pool fires, jet fires and fireballs for checking models that predict the heat from fires at LNG plants; a modeler enters results into a spreadsheet that scores them against the measurements. A second version followed in April 2026.
Credit
Sandia National Laboratories (Anay Luketa and colleagues)
2022
Freeport's trapped pipe
On 8 June 2022 an 18-inch vacuum-insulated LNG pipe on a rack near the storage tanks at Freeport LNG, Texas, burst, and the released LNG and methane exploded and burned; no one was hurt. The root cause report, as summarized by Freeport, found that LNG had been shut in a stretch of pipe without working overpressure protection and warmed until the pipe ruptured. It named missing relief valve test procedures, no car seal program (tags that keep safety valves in their set position), no alarm for rising pipe temperature, operators unfamiliar with procedures, overtime fatigue and alarms that sounded constantly for equipment out of service for years.
Lessona stretch of cold liquid pipe that can be shut in needs both a relief path and a warning.
Credit
Freeport LNG Development (operator); IFO Group (root cause analysis); PHMSA (safety order)
Watch for
A new rulebook for plants
PHMSA proposed on 3 November 2026 to replace the 2001 edition of the NFPA 59A standard in its LNG rules with the 2026 edition, which it says is seven editions newer. Developers could site plants by set distances or by a quantitative risk analysis, a calculation of the likelihood and harm of each possible accident; small permanent plants would get their own rules, and incident reporting would widen. PHMSA estimates savings of about $98 million a year and says the risk-based siting will improve safety.
Achieved whenthe final rule is published in the Federal Register and takes effect, and incident data from the years after show whether safety improved.
Claimed by
PHMSA, November 2026
Open
01
Find trapped liquid in drawings
An open checker that reads a piping and instrument diagram in DEXPI, a standard file format for such drawings, and flags every stretch of liquid pipe that can be shut in between closed valves without a relief valve, together with a public test set of made-up drawings with such stretches planted in them.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Match accident lessons to rules
A public table listing every recommendation from the public investigations of major LNG accidents (Cove Point 1979, Skikda 2004, Freeport 2022 and others with reports), each mapped to the clause of PHMSA's proposed rule or of NFPA 59A-2026 that covers it, or marked "not covered".
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Find trapped liquid in drawings
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
An open checker that reads a piping and instrument diagram in DEXPI, a standard file format for such drawings, and flags every stretch of liquid pipe that can be shut in between closed valves without a relief valve, together with a public test set of made-up drawings with such stretches planted in them.
Why it is still open
At Freeport, LNG shut in a stretch of pipe without working overpressure protection burst the pipe, and a 2016 hazard study had not considered that case. Open tools come close: TU Dortmund's preHAZOP finds some hazards automatically in DEXPI drawings, but its list of scenarios does not include liquid trapped between closed valves. A 2025 app, pid-hazop-analyzer, writes hazard reports from drawing images. GitHub and Crossref searches found no public test set for trapped liquid.
Built with what exists
pyDEXPI, an open-source Python library for DEXPI files; the NetworkX graph library; an open-weights language model run in-house to help draft rules, since real drawings are confidential (see the Note "A trillion open parameters").
First step
Draw one small loading-line layout with pyDEXPI, plant one shut-in stretch, and write the first graph rule that finds it.
Done looks like
200 made-up DEXPI drawings, 100 of them with a planted shut-in stretch; the checker finds at least 95 and flags no more than 5 of the clean drawings; drawings, checker and scores published.
Open 02 · the brief
Match accident lessons to rules
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public table listing every recommendation from the public investigations of major LNG accidents (Cove Point 1979, Skikda 2004, Freeport 2022 and others with reports), each mapped to the clause of PHMSA's proposed rule or of NFPA 59A-2026 that covers it, or marked "not covered".
Why it is still open
PHMSA's proposed rule cites the Freeport failure once, to set the size of design spills from pipe-in-pipe transfer lines, and its text does not mention relief valve testing, car seals or shut-in pipe, the root causes reported at Freeport. Comments are due on 4 January 2027. One search found no such mapping.
Built with what exists
The public investigation reports and summaries (NTSB, IChemE, PHMSA, FERC); the proposed rule's text; NFPA 59A-2026; an AI model that reads long documents and cites the passage behind each match, with a person approving each one (see the Note "Findings that cite notes"; see the Note "Seven more flagged").
First step
List the recommendations in the Freeport root cause summary and search the proposed rule's text for each one.
Done looks like
Every recommendation from at least five public investigation reports listed with its page and mapped; a second reviewer agrees on at least 90% of the mappings; the table filed as a public comment in docket PHMSA-2019-0091 before the deadline.