Industries / Energy, water and waste / Power generation / Hydroelectric
Dam safety
Dam safety work inspects, monitors and repairs hydropower dams, and plans for the floods, landslides and failures that could overwhelm them.
7
Milestones achieved, from 1965 to 2023.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1965
Inspections every five years
On 27 December 1965 the US Federal Power Commission, the agency that preceded the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), issued Order No. 315. It required owners of licensed hydropower projects to have their dams and works fully inspected by independent consultants every five years, or more often if needed, on top of the commission's own inspections. FERC folded the rule into Part 12 of its regulations in 1981, and the five-year cycle still stands.
Credit
Federal Power Commission
2005
Sensors fail at Taum Sauk
On 14 December 2005 the upper reservoir of AmerenUE's Taum Sauk pumped storage plant in Missouri, a basin ringed by a rockfill wall, overflowed in the last minutes of a pumping cycle, and the wall washed out. About 4,300 acre-feet of water (about 5.3 million cubic meters) left through a 656-foot (200 m) breach in 25 minutes, destroying about 281 acres of Johnson's Shut-Ins State Park and injuring four people; nobody died. The water-level sensors had come loose months earlier and read low, the backup probes were set above the lowest point of the wall, and nobody checked the sensors against the real water level.
Lessonby ASDSO's account, small instrument problems can grow into major failures, and pumped storage reservoirs need an emergency spillway or other backup against overflowing.
Credit
case record by the Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO)
2018
A saddle dam gives way
On 23 July 2018 Saddle Dam D at the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower project in southern Laos collapsed. A saddle dam closes a low point in a reservoir's rim away from the main dam. The flood swept through 12 villages and killed at least 40 people, by Radio Free Asia's count. In May 2019 Laos's National Investigation Committee released the finding of its Independent Expert Panel: water seeping through permeable, easily eroded layers had softened the dam's foundation until a deep slide breached it. The panel said the cause was "not force majeure" and that the failure "could have been prevented by adequate treatment measures."
Lessonthe investigators recommended building the project's other saddle dams in concrete.
Credit
Lao National Investigation Committee and Independent Expert Panel; the project company was a consortium that included SK Engineering & Construction of South Korea
2020
Edenville fails after losing license
On 19 May 2020, after several days of rain, the Edenville Dam in Michigan failed, and its flood overtopped and broke the Sanford Dam downstream. About 10,000 people were evacuated, starting about 18 hours before either dam failed, and nobody died; ASDSO puts property damage at over $200 million. Two years earlier FERC had revoked Edenville's hydropower license, as a last resort, because its spillway could pass only about 20% to 50% of the probable maximum flood, the largest flood thought possible at the site. The independent forensic team found that loose, poorly compacted sand in the embankment suddenly lost its strength, a process called static liquefaction.
Lessonby ASDSO's account, dams with loose sand or silt should be checked for static liquefaction, and periodic reviews should go back to the original design and construction records.
Credit
Edenville and Sanford Independent Forensic Team; case record by ASDSO
2021
Avalanche hits two plants
On 7 February 2021 about 27 million cubic meters of rock and glacier ice broke off Ronti Peak in Uttarakhand, India, and turned into a fast debris flow that destroyed the Rishiganga plant (13.2 MW) and overran the dam of the Tapovan Vishnugad plant (520 MW) downstream. Of the 204 people killed or missing, 190 were workers at the two sites. A team of 53 scientists who rebuilt the event from satellite images, seismic records and videos estimated that a warning system could have given 6 to 10 minutes' notice at Tapovan, perhaps enough to get some workers out.
Lessonthe authors name the location of hydropower plants "in the direct path of the flow" as one of three reasons the event became a disaster.
Credit
D. H. Shugar and colleagues, Science (2021)
2022
Risk analysis every ten years
In a final rule published on 11 January 2022, FERC split its five-yearly independent inspections into two kinds that alternate. One is a periodic inspection. The other, every ten years, is a comprehensive assessment that must include a potential failure modes analysis, a structured search for the ways a dam could fail, and a semi-quantitative risk analysis, which grades how likely and how harmful each failure would be. FERC wrote the rule in answer to the findings after the 2017 Oroville spillway incident. Projects already inspected must file their first comprehensive assessment by 31 December 2038.
Credit
FERC
2023
Outburst flood destroys Teesta-III
On 3 October 2023, 14.7 million cubic meters of frozen moraine, the loose ridge of rock a glacier leaves behind, collapsed into South Lhonak Lake in Sikkim, India. The impact raised a wave about 20 m high that broke through the moraine holding the lake and drained about 50 million cubic meters of water. This glacial lake outburst flood picked up about 270 million cubic meters of sediment, reached Chungthang, 68 km away, about two hours later, and destroyed the dam of the 1,200 MW Teesta-III plant before damaging four other dams downstream. Carbon Brief counts 55 deaths.
Credit
A. Sattar and colleagues, Science (2025)
Watch for
Warnings from 130 km upstream
Hydropower projects in Bhutan's Punatsangchhu basin and the National Center for Hydrology and Meteorology (NCHM) say they have set up an early warning system for glacial lake outburst floods and other floods: 10 upstream stations that measure weather and water levels, including stations at four glacial lakes in Lunana about 130 to 140 km upstream of the Punatsangchhu-II dam, and 18 siren stations. They say the readings give the operator time to act, for example by opening the dam's radial gates, and give villages time to respond, but the report gives no warning times and no test results.
Achieved whena drill or a real flood shows how many minutes of warning reached the plant and the villages downstream, published by NCHM or an outside reviewer.
Claimed by
Punatsangchhu hydropower projects and NCHM, reported by Kuensel, September 2026
Open
01
Glacial flood risk beyond Himalaya
A plant-by-plant estimate of how large a glacial lake outburst flood could be when it reaches each hydropower plant in the Andes and Central Asia, set beside the design flood, the largest flood each plant's spillway was built to pass. A glacial lake outburst flood is the sudden release of a lake held back by ice or loose rock.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Dam failure answer key
A public set of at least 150 questions drawn from documented dam failures and incidents, each asking which failure mode was at work, which warning sign was missed or which fix would have helped, with answers agreed by dam engineers; then a published test of current AI models on it.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Glacial flood risk beyond Himalaya
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A plant-by-plant estimate of how large a glacial lake outburst flood could be when it reaches each hydropower plant in the Andes and Central Asia, set beside the design flood, the largest flood each plant's spillway was built to pass. A glacial lake outburst flood is the sudden release of a lake held back by ice or loose rock.
Why it is still open
In 2016 Schwanghart and colleagues did this for 257 Himalayan plants. They found 66% on potential outburst paths and up to a third of those facing flows well above their design floods, and wrote that detailed appraisals had been "limited to case studies." Since then outburst floods destroyed Teesta-III in 2023 and damaged twelve plants in Nepal in 2026. Searches found glacial lake inventories and single-basin studies for Peru, Chile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but no plant-by-plant count of exposed hydropower there.
Built with what exists
The method in Schwanghart's paper, a flood-wave model fed by many random outburst volumes; open flow models such as r.avaflow, used to rebuild the Chamoli flood; Global Energy Monitor's Global Hydropower Tracker for plant locations; national glacial lake inventories; the free Copernicus 30 m elevation model; design floods from feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments; Python.
First step
Rerun the 2016 method on 10 Himalayan plants listed in the paper's supplement and compare the results with its chart of design floods against modeled peaks.
Done looks like
At least 100 operating or planned plants in the Andes and Central Asia, each with its upstream lakes, the modeled range of outburst peak flows and the published design flood where one can be found, released with code; a rerun on 10 of the 2016 paper's Himalayan plants that falls within its published ranges.
Open 02 · the brief
Dam failure answer key
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public set of at least 150 questions drawn from documented dam failures and incidents, each asking which failure mode was at work, which warning sign was missed or which fix would have helped, with answers agreed by dam engineers; then a published test of current AI models on it.
Why it is still open
The closest test, Hydro-SE Bench, has 4,000 multiple-choice questions across all of hydro-science and engineering, not failure cases, and found that models struggle with "industry standards and hydraulic structures." ASDSO's Dam Failures and Lessons Learned site holds more than 70 case studies with lessons, which nobody has turned into a test. In September 2026 a GitHub account named ndsa-gov posted 115 quiz questions with answers on India's Dam Safety Act of 2021, its national register of dams, instrumentation and hazard classes; none is built from a failure case, and no AI model is tested on them. Searches of the web, Crossref and arXiv found no public test of AI models on dam failure cases.
Built with what exists
ASDSO's case studies and the published forensic reports for Oroville and Edenville; a language model to draft candidate questions; Inspect, the UK AI Security Institute's open-source evaluation framework, to run the test; two dam engineers to write and check the answers.
First step
Write 20 questions from 10 hydropower cases on the ASDSO site, such as Taum Sauk and Edenville, and have one dam engineer review them.
Done looks like
150 questions from at least 50 cases, at least 30 of them from hydropower dams, each answer agreed by two dam engineers; scores for at least five models published with the question set under an open license.