Industries / Energy, water and waste / Oil and gas extraction / Offshore drilling
Holding position in weather
A floating rig must stay almost directly above its well while connected to it, held by anchors or by its own computer-controlled propellers, and its crew must know when to disconnect and move away from a storm.
6
Milestones achieved, from 1961 to 2020.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1961
Thrusters hold a ship
A ship drilling in deep water cannot anchor, so it must hold its place over the hole with its own propellers, which is called dynamic positioning. In March 1961 the drilling barge CUSS I did this with manually controlled thrusters for Project Mohole, and drilled a hole 183 m deep in 3,570 m of water off Guadalupe Island, Mexico. From May 1961 Shell's coring ship Eureka held position automatically, with two thrusters and analog controllers designed by Howard Shatto, and drilled as many as nine core holes a day in water up to 4,000 ft deep.
Credit
the CUSS group and Project Mohole (US National Science Foundation); Howard Shatto (Shell)
1994
Three classes of backup
The International Maritime Organization's guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning, approved in May 1994 and issued on 6 June 1994, sort them into three equipment classes. In class 1 a single fault may cause loss of position. In class 2 no single fault in an active part, such as a generator, thruster or switchboard, may do so. In class 3 the vessel must also keep position after losing everything in one watertight compartment to fire or flooding. The class needed for a job is agreed from a risk analysis of what losing position would cause.
Credit
IMO Maritime Safety Committee; Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment
2005
Rigs torn from anchors
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita tore 19 mobile drilling units from their anchor moorings in the Gulf of Mexico, the US Minerals Management Service reported on 4 October 2005. One drifting rig dragged its anchors across the oil and gas pipelines of the Mars production platform, whose output was shut in from August until May, and most rigs broke free at the fairlead, the guide where a mooring line leaves the hull. An interim industry practice, API RP 95F, then set a minimum design storm of a 10-year return period for the hurricane season, and nearly all rigs working in the Gulf moved from eight to 12 mooring lines, Offshore magazine reported in 2009.
Lessona mooring too weak for a big storm puts nearby pipelines and platforms at risk, not just the rig.
Credit
Minerals Management Service; American Petroleum Institute
2012
Kulluk runs aground
Shell's Kulluk, a round-hulled Arctic drilling unit, was under tow across the Gulf of Alaska in a winter storm when a shackle on the towline failed and the towing vessel Aiviq lost all four main engines, which the Coast Guard linked to seawater getting into the fuel. Coast Guard helicopters lifted off its 18-person crew, and on 31 December 2012 the Kulluk grounded off Sitkalidak Island, near Kodiak. The Coast Guard's April 2014 report found Shell had failed to assess and manage the risks of the tow, and said Alaska tax laws influenced the decision to leave when it did.
Lessona tow must wait for the weather, whatever the schedule says.
Credit
US Coast Guard (investigation); Shell (operator)
2020
Batteries as backup power
On dynamic positioning, a rig keeps spare generators running so that one failure does not cut power to the thrusters; this spare running capacity is called spinning reserve. DNV GL changed its dynamic positioning rules to let batteries count as spinning reserve on vessels designed to IMO equipment class 2 or 3, and by January 2020 Northern Drilling's semisubmersible West Mira, using four converter-battery systems, was the first rig in operation to hold DNV GL's Battery (Power) class notation. The operator's own estimate was 42% less diesel engine running time.
Credit
DNV GL; Northern Drilling
2020
Riding out a hurricane
On 28 October 2020 Transocean's drillship Deepwater Asgard stayed connected to a Beacon Offshore Energy well in 5,594 ft of water as Hurricane Zeta arrived, because sister ships had ridden out similar storms. With its thrusters at full power it was pushed to its red watch circle (the furthest it may drift before the pipe to the seabed must be released), 159 ft off the well, disconnected, and drifted 1.9 nautical miles. The riser hit the hull, the lower riser package struck the seafloor twice, and repairs were estimated at $5.7 million. The regulator BSEE found the forecast had shown the storm passing to the east.
Lessonwhen a storm may reach hurricane strength, secure the well and leave early; Beacon told BSEE it would recommend disconnecting and moving away for any forecast of Category 1 winds.
Credit
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (investigation); Transocean; Beacon Offshore Energy
Watch for
Remote control of station keeping
Seadrill, Kongsberg Maritime and Hanwha Drilling formed an alliance to develop remote dynamic positioning for drilling rigs, meant to centralize the work and reduce crew workload, and to build the technical and regulatory basis for using it. No rig, trial or timeline is named, and Seadrill calls the alliance "the first step."
Achieved whena drilling rig holds station over a well with its dynamic positioning supervised or controlled remotely in routine work, with approval from a classification society or regulator.
Claimed by
Seadrill, Kongsberg Maritime and Hanwha Drilling, March 2026
Open
01
Test forecasts against disconnects
An open case file of every weather-forced emergency disconnect reported by the US regulator, each with the forecast the crew had, the winds measured nearby, radar and satellite images, and a score for how many minutes of warning each source gave.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Storm drift in ship tracks
An open record, built from public AIS tracks, of every time a floating rig in the US Gulf of Mexico was pushed off its well by weather between 2009 and 2024, with distance, duration and the storm, matched to the regulator's reports.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Test forecasts against disconnects
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
An open case file of every weather-forced emergency disconnect reported by the US regulator, each with the forecast the crew had, the winds measured nearby, radar and satellite images, and a score for how many minutes of warning each source gave.
Why it is still open
BSEE's own reports show forecasts missing sudden storms. Before the Noble Stanley Lafosse disconnected on 29 May 2025, forecasts indicated winds not exceeding 10 knots, then a 60-knot gust struck; the Discoverer Inspiration's weather service showed nothing above 45 knots before 67-knot winds on 21 April 2023; and the Deepwater Poseidon met a 60-knot wind that "was not forecasted" on 5 March 2024. A 2014 conference paper by Jeans and colleagues estimated from public data how often strong Gulf squalls occur, and called its estimates preliminary, but did not test forecasts. Searches for this file found machine-learning nowcasts of fog and of convective gusts elsewhere, but none checked against drilling disconnects.
Built with what exists
BSEE incident reports; NOAA National Data Buoy Center records; NOAA's NEXRAD radar and GOES satellite archives; archived HRRR and GFS forecasts; pySTEPS, an open-source library for radar nowcasting (forecasts for the next hour or two); AI weather models released with open weights.
First step
List every BSEE incident report since 2014 that mentions an emergency disconnect caused by weather, with its date, block and reported wind.
Done looks like
At least 10 disconnect events, each with the forecast in force, the measured winds and the minutes of warning given by that forecast and by a radar nowcast, plus false alarms counted over at least 100 days without events at the same sites, all published with code.
Open 02 · the brief
Storm drift in ship tracks
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
An open record, built from public AIS tracks, of every time a floating rig in the US Gulf of Mexico was pushed off its well by weather between 2009 and 2024, with distance, duration and the storm, matched to the regulator's reports.
Why it is still open
The public record is a set of single reports. BSEE's report gives Deepwater Asgard's 1.9 nautical-mile drift in 2020; counts of rigs adrift in 2005 differ by source (19 for Katrina and Rita from the Minerals Management Service, 16 across Ivan, Katrina and Rita from Offshore magazine); and the 2008 "No MODUs Adrift" study for the Minerals Management Service modeled the drift of two unnamed rigs from those hurricanes, not the fleet.
Built with what exists
MarineCadastre daily AIS files, 2009 to 2024; BSEE borehole locations and dates; NOAA's HURDAT2 hurricane tracks; Python.
First step
Check whether MarineCadastre's files show Deepwater Asgard at all on 27 to 29 October 2020, since NOAA describes the shore network as reaching about 24 nautical miles offshore, and if they do, whether the track shows the 1.9 nautical-mile drift BSEE reported.
Done looks like
Every floating rig on a BSEE well from 2009 to 2024 checked, each move of more than 50 m from the well listed with time, distance and weather, and every BSEE-reported weather disconnect that has AIS coverage found by the method, with table and code published.