BRENNEN

Industries / Industrial equipment and services / IoT and industrial automation

Security

Control-system security keeps attackers from reading, changing or stopping the controllers and networks that run a plant.

7

Milestones achieved, from 2000 to 2024.

2

To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.

2

Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.

The road

AchievedWatch forOpen

Achieved

  1. 2000

    An insider takes the radio

    Between February and April 2000 a former site supervisor for Hunter Watertech, the contractor that had installed the radio-linked control system for Maroochy Shire Council's sewage network in Queensland, Australia, sent commands to its pumping stations from a computer and a two-way radio; on 23 April he disabled alarms at four of them. MITRE's ATT&CK knowledge base puts the spill at 800,000 litres of raw sewage. He was convicted, and the Queensland Court of Appeal upheld most counts in 2002.

    LessonA control system reachable by radio is open to anyone with the equipment and the knowledge, including a former contractor.

    queenslandjudgments.com.auattack.mitre.org

    Credit

    Queensland Court of Appeal (R v Boden); MITRE

  2. 2007

    Security standards for control

    ISA set up its ISA99 committee in 2002 and published its first documents, ISA-TR99.00.01-2007 and ISA-62443-1-1-2007, in 2007. The series became ISA/IEC 62443, which the IEC recognized in 2021 as a horizontal standard, one that applies across industries.

    isa.org

    Credit

    the ISA99 committee; IEC

  3. 2010

    Code that broke machines

    Stuxnet was built "to reprogram industrial control systems (ICS) by modifying code on programmable logic controllers (PLCs)" and to hide the changes from operators, Symantec found; it called the hiding code "the first ever PLC rootkit." It changed motor drive frequencies from 1,410 Hz to 2 Hz to 1,064 Hz, outside a normal range of 807 to 1,210 Hz, and about 60% of infected computers were in Iran.

    LessonMalicious code can damage equipment while showing operators normal readings.

    docs.broadcom.com

    Credit

    Symantec researchers Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu and Eric Chien (analysis)

  4. 2015

    Breakers opened from afar

    On 23 December 2015 attackers cut power to about 225,000 customers of three regional electricity distribution companies in Ukraine; the US government's alert says "malicious remote operation of the breakers was conducted by multiple external humans," and that they corrupted the firmware of devices at substations. In December 2016 malware that spoke the grid protocols IEC 101, IEC 104 and IEC 61850 caused a one-hour outage in Kyiv, ESET reported.

    cisa.govwelivesecurity.com

    Credit

    CISA (analysis of 2015); ESET and Dragos (the 2016 malware)

  5. 2017

    Malware aimed at safety

    Mandiant reported in December 2017 that an attacker had deployed TRITON, malware "designed to manipulate industrial safety systems," the independent controllers that shut a plant down when conditions turn dangerous. Some of these controllers entered a failed safe state and shut down the process, by accident in Mandiant's assessment; CISA identified the targets as Schneider Electric Triconex controllers.

    LessonMandiant advised keeping safety systems on separate networks and not leaving controllers' key switches in program mode.

    cloud.google.comcisa.gov

    Credit

    Mandiant (FireEye); CISA, with Schneider Electric

  6. 2023

    Default passwords on water plants

    Beginning on 22 November 2023, attackers using the name "CyberAv3ngers," which US agencies tie to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, took over Unitronics PLCs at US water facilities that were reachable from the internet and had a default password or none. They compromised at least 75 devices, at least 34 of them in the US water sector.

    LessonA controller on the internet with its default password can be taken over by anyone who finds it.

    cisa.gov

    Credit

    CISA and partner agencies (advisory AA23-335A)

  7. 2024

    Heat cut by Modbus

    In January 2024 an attack on the heating system for more than 600 apartment buildings in a Ukrainian city, Lviv according to Dragos, left them without heat for almost two days in sub-zero temperatures. Dragos, which found the malware, FrostyGoop, in April 2024, calls it the first malware for industrial control systems to use Modbus TCP to affect operations, and counts more than 46,000 internet-exposed devices that speak Modbus TCP.

    hub.dragos.comdragos.com

    Credit

    Dragos; Ukraine's Cyber Security Situation Center (CSSC)

Watch for

  1. AI-written tools against PLCs

    The NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA say attackers are using "AI-generated exploitation scripts disguised as legitimate monitoring tools" to read and write the memory and logic of Siemens S7 PLCs. The advisory gives no evidence for the AI-generated assessment.

    Achieved whena published forensic analysis shows how the tools were made.

    cisa.gov

    Claimed by

    NSA, CISA, FBI, DOE and EPA, August 2026

  2. AI ports a PLC exploit

    Forescout's researchers used an AI coding agent, Claude Code, to adapt a known exploit for one WAGO PLC model to an unpatched sibling model; the final stage took 8 hours 32 minutes and cost $535.74 in AI use, and a later attempt left a PLC unusable. The model also flagged what Forescout calls a previously unidentified vulnerability.

    Achieved whenWAGO confirms the flaw, it receives a CVE number, or another group reproduces the result.

    forescout.com

    Claimed by

    Forescout, September 2026

Open

  1. 01

    Score products on CISA's questions

    A public table that answers, for each of at least 30 common PLCs, operator panels and remote terminal units, the questions in the US government's Secure by Demand checklist for control-system buyers, such as "Has the manufacturer eliminated default passwords?", with each answer citing the page of the maker's manual or advisory it came from.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed
  2. 02

    Prove a protocol parser safe

    A message parser for Modbus TCP generated with EverParse, Microsoft Research's open-source tool that turns a formal description of a message format into C code proven free of memory errors, built into an open-source Modbus library and offered to its maintainers.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed

Open 01 · the brief

Score products on CISA's questions

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A public table that answers, for each of at least 30 common PLCs, operator panels and remote terminal units, the questions in the US government's Secure by Demand checklist for control-system buyers, such as "Has the manufacturer eliminated default passwords?", with each answer citing the page of the maker's manual or advisory it came from.

Why it is still open

CISA and partner agencies published the checklist for buyers in January 2025 and a fact sheet in April 2025 that lists its elements "without ranking or priority"; neither rates products, and searches found no public scorecard that does.

cisa.govcybersecuritynews.com

Built with what exists

makers' public manuals and security advisories and CISA's ICS advisories; AI agents that read long documents and cite each finding (see the Notes "Seven more flagged" and "A thousand questions, one pass"); two people checking every cell.

  1. First step

    Take the Unitronics PLC series named in CISA's 2023 advisory and answer the checklist for it from its public manual.

  2. Done looks like

    30 products scored on all 12 elements, every cell with a citation, published with the two checkers' agreement rate of at least 90%, after each maker has had the chance to comment.

Open 02 · the brief

Prove a protocol parser safe

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A message parser for Modbus TCP generated with EverParse, Microsoft Research's open-source tool that turns a formal description of a message format into C code proven free of memory errors, built into an open-source Modbus library and offered to its maintainers.

Why it is still open

Fuzz testing, which floods a program with malformed messages, by Adam Crain and Chris Sistrunk in 2013–2014 found most commercial DNP3 implementations open to attack, and more than 30 vulnerabilities were reported for DNP3 in those two years; a hardened DNP3 parser by Sergey Bratus of Dartmouth College and colleagues in 2016 was tested by fuzzing, not proved. MITRE's EMB3D threat model lists formally verified parsers as a mitigation for embedded devices, and searches found no proven parser for Modbus, DNP3 or OPC UA.

ws.engr.illinois.eduemb3d.mitre.org

Built with what exists

EverParse (Apache 2.0 licence); libmodbus, an open-source Modbus library; AFL++ for fuzzing; AI agents to draft the format description and check it against the protocol specification (see the Notes "Proven in four weeks" and "Cyber defenders first"). AI agents that help a few people write proofs about real code are what bring this within reach of a small team.

  1. First step

    Write the EverParse description of the Modbus TCP header and one function code, then generate the parser and fuzz it for a day.

  2. Done looks like

    A parser covering at least the eight most-used Modbus function codes whose proofs check automatically, built into libmodbus, passing its existing tests and 72 hours of fuzzing without a crash, and submitted upstream.