Industries / Industrial equipment and services / IoT and industrial automation
Security
Control-system security keeps attackers from reading, changing or stopping the controllers and networks that run a plant.
7
Milestones achieved, from 2000 to 2024.
2
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
2000
An insider takes the radio
Between February and April 2000 a former site supervisor for Hunter Watertech, the contractor that had installed the radio-linked control system for Maroochy Shire Council's sewage network in Queensland, Australia, sent commands to its pumping stations from a computer and a two-way radio; on 23 April he disabled alarms at four of them. MITRE's ATT&CK knowledge base puts the spill at 800,000 litres of raw sewage. He was convicted, and the Queensland Court of Appeal upheld most counts in 2002.
LessonA control system reachable by radio is open to anyone with the equipment and the knowledge, including a former contractor.
Credit
Queensland Court of Appeal (R v Boden); MITRE
2007
Security standards for control
ISA set up its ISA99 committee in 2002 and published its first documents, ISA-TR99.00.01-2007 and ISA-62443-1-1-2007, in 2007. The series became ISA/IEC 62443, which the IEC recognized in 2021 as a horizontal standard, one that applies across industries.
Credit
the ISA99 committee; IEC
2010
Code that broke machines
Stuxnet was built "to reprogram industrial control systems (ICS) by modifying code on programmable logic controllers (PLCs)" and to hide the changes from operators, Symantec found; it called the hiding code "the first ever PLC rootkit." It changed motor drive frequencies from 1,410 Hz to 2 Hz to 1,064 Hz, outside a normal range of 807 to 1,210 Hz, and about 60% of infected computers were in Iran.
LessonMalicious code can damage equipment while showing operators normal readings.
Credit
Symantec researchers Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu and Eric Chien (analysis)
2015
Breakers opened from afar
On 23 December 2015 attackers cut power to about 225,000 customers of three regional electricity distribution companies in Ukraine; the US government's alert says "malicious remote operation of the breakers was conducted by multiple external humans," and that they corrupted the firmware of devices at substations. In December 2016 malware that spoke the grid protocols IEC 101, IEC 104 and IEC 61850 caused a one-hour outage in Kyiv, ESET reported.
Credit
CISA (analysis of 2015); ESET and Dragos (the 2016 malware)
2017
Malware aimed at safety
Mandiant reported in December 2017 that an attacker had deployed TRITON, malware "designed to manipulate industrial safety systems," the independent controllers that shut a plant down when conditions turn dangerous. Some of these controllers entered a failed safe state and shut down the process, by accident in Mandiant's assessment; CISA identified the targets as Schneider Electric Triconex controllers.
LessonMandiant advised keeping safety systems on separate networks and not leaving controllers' key switches in program mode.
Credit
Mandiant (FireEye); CISA, with Schneider Electric
2023
Default passwords on water plants
Beginning on 22 November 2023, attackers using the name "CyberAv3ngers," which US agencies tie to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, took over Unitronics PLCs at US water facilities that were reachable from the internet and had a default password or none. They compromised at least 75 devices, at least 34 of them in the US water sector.
LessonA controller on the internet with its default password can be taken over by anyone who finds it.
Credit
CISA and partner agencies (advisory AA23-335A)
2024
Heat cut by Modbus
In January 2024 an attack on the heating system for more than 600 apartment buildings in a Ukrainian city, Lviv according to Dragos, left them without heat for almost two days in sub-zero temperatures. Dragos, which found the malware, FrostyGoop, in April 2024, calls it the first malware for industrial control systems to use Modbus TCP to affect operations, and counts more than 46,000 internet-exposed devices that speak Modbus TCP.
Credit
Dragos; Ukraine's Cyber Security Situation Center (CSSC)
Watch for
AI-written tools against PLCs
The NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA say attackers are using "AI-generated exploitation scripts disguised as legitimate monitoring tools" to read and write the memory and logic of Siemens S7 PLCs. The advisory gives no evidence for the AI-generated assessment.
Achieved whena published forensic analysis shows how the tools were made.
Claimed by
NSA, CISA, FBI, DOE and EPA, August 2026
AI ports a PLC exploit
Forescout's researchers used an AI coding agent, Claude Code, to adapt a known exploit for one WAGO PLC model to an unpatched sibling model; the final stage took 8 hours 32 minutes and cost $535.74 in AI use, and a later attempt left a PLC unusable. The model also flagged what Forescout calls a previously unidentified vulnerability.
Achieved whenWAGO confirms the flaw, it receives a CVE number, or another group reproduces the result.
Claimed by
Forescout, September 2026
Open
01
Score products on CISA's questions
A public table that answers, for each of at least 30 common PLCs, operator panels and remote terminal units, the questions in the US government's Secure by Demand checklist for control-system buyers, such as "Has the manufacturer eliminated default passwords?", with each answer citing the page of the maker's manual or advisory it came from.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Prove a protocol parser safe
A message parser for Modbus TCP generated with EverParse, Microsoft Research's open-source tool that turns a formal description of a message format into C code proven free of memory errors, built into an open-source Modbus library and offered to its maintainers.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Score products on CISA's questions
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public table that answers, for each of at least 30 common PLCs, operator panels and remote terminal units, the questions in the US government's Secure by Demand checklist for control-system buyers, such as "Has the manufacturer eliminated default passwords?", with each answer citing the page of the maker's manual or advisory it came from.
Why it is still open
CISA and partner agencies published the checklist for buyers in January 2025 and a fact sheet in April 2025 that lists its elements "without ranking or priority"; neither rates products, and searches found no public scorecard that does.
Built with what exists
makers' public manuals and security advisories and CISA's ICS advisories; AI agents that read long documents and cite each finding (see the Notes "Seven more flagged" and "A thousand questions, one pass"); two people checking every cell.
First step
Take the Unitronics PLC series named in CISA's 2023 advisory and answer the checklist for it from its public manual.
Done looks like
30 products scored on all 12 elements, every cell with a citation, published with the two checkers' agreement rate of at least 90%, after each maker has had the chance to comment.
Open 02 · the brief
Prove a protocol parser safe
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A message parser for Modbus TCP generated with EverParse, Microsoft Research's open-source tool that turns a formal description of a message format into C code proven free of memory errors, built into an open-source Modbus library and offered to its maintainers.
Why it is still open
Fuzz testing, which floods a program with malformed messages, by Adam Crain and Chris Sistrunk in 2013–2014 found most commercial DNP3 implementations open to attack, and more than 30 vulnerabilities were reported for DNP3 in those two years; a hardened DNP3 parser by Sergey Bratus of Dartmouth College and colleagues in 2016 was tested by fuzzing, not proved. MITRE's EMB3D threat model lists formally verified parsers as a mitigation for embedded devices, and searches found no proven parser for Modbus, DNP3 or OPC UA.
Built with what exists
EverParse (Apache 2.0 licence); libmodbus, an open-source Modbus library; AFL++ for fuzzing; AI agents to draft the format description and check it against the protocol specification (see the Notes "Proven in four weeks" and "Cyber defenders first"). AI agents that help a few people write proofs about real code are what bring this within reach of a small team.
First step
Write the EverParse description of the Modbus TCP header and one function code, then generate the parser and fuzz it for a day.
Done looks like
A parser covering at least the eight most-used Modbus function codes whose proofs check automatically, built into libmodbus, passing its existing tests and 72 hours of fuzzing without a crash, and submitted upstream.