Industries / Construction and property / EPC contractors
Contracts and risk
The contract decides who pays when a plant costs more than planned, finishes late or fails its tests: the owner, the contractor, or the partners in a contractor joint venture.
6
Milestones achieved, from 1999 to 2025.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1999
One form for turnkey plants
FIDIC, the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, published its Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects, the Silver Book, in 1999, beside its Red Book for construction and its Yellow Book for plant and design-build. Under a turnkey contract one contractor designs, buys and builds the whole works and hands it over ready to run. FIDIC's own guidance shows how much the form leaves with the contractor: it says not to use it where bidders lack the time or information to check the owner's requirements, where much of the work is underground and cannot be inspected, or where the owner means to supervise the work closely. Its 2017 second edition "maintains the principles of risk sharing established in the 1999 edition."
Credit
FIDIC
2017
A fixed price falls away
On 31 July 2017 South Carolina Electric & Gas, a SCANA subsidiary, and the state utility Santee Cooper stopped building two reactors at the V.C. Summer plant, begun in 2009 and due online in 2019 and 2020. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) lists rising costs, falling demand, delays and the bankruptcy of Westinghouse, the lead contractor and reactor designer, as the reasons. The American Nuclear Society reported that both owners called the bankruptcy the key factor, because it meant losing the EPC contract and its fixed-price guarantee; the engineer and constructor under Westinghouse was the former CB&I Shaw Stone & Webster group.
Lessona fixed price protects an owner only as far as the contractor can pay for the overrun.
Credit
SCE&G and Santee Cooper (owners); Westinghouse (contractor)
2019
Contractors leave lump sum
A lump-sum contract fixes the price of the whole job in advance. In August 2019 three large listed contractors said they would stop chasing fixed-price work, Engineering News-Record (ENR) reported. SNC-Lavalin, after a US$1.6 billion quarterly loss, said it would not bid on future lump-sum turnkey projects; its interim chief executive, Ian Edwards, called fixed-price contracts the "root cause" of its problems and said "the current model within our industry is broken." Fluor took a US$714 million pretax charge after a strategic review and said it would bid fixed-price energy and chemicals work only where the bid list is short and it has a measurable advantage.
Lessonfixed prices on very large jobs moved more risk to contractors than their earnings could absorb.
Credit
SNC-Lavalin; Fluor; Granite Construction
2020
One plant, two rescued builders
Cameron LNG, an export plant at Hackberry, Louisiana, was built by CB&I together with the Japanese contractor Chiyoda. Chiyoda lost US$953.5 million in the six months to 30 September 2018, mainly, it said, from rising labor costs and a severe shortage of skilled workers on the Gulf Coast, where a rush of LNG plants and the rebuilding after Hurricane Harvey competed for crews; in May 2019 Mitsubishi Corp and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group agreed a rescue of about US$1.4 billion, by the Nikkei's report. McDermott, which had bought CB&I in May 2018, went into Chapter 11 bankruptcy with a prepackaged plan dated 21 January 2020. Its disclosure statement blames legacy CB&I loss projects, Cameron LNG and Freeport LNG above all, and says it had reached the limit of its letters of credit, the bank guarantees each new contract requires, while holding a record backlog above US$19 billion.
Lessona contractor can run out of guarantees for new work while it is still winning it.
globalconstructionreview.comglobalconstructionreview.comsec.gov
Credit
Chiyoda; McDermott (CB&I)
2023
Reimbursable, but still liable
Under a cost-reimbursable contract the owner pays the contractor's actual costs plus a fee, so the owner normally carries overruns. Reficar, Ecopetrol's refinery company, hired CB&I in 2010 to expand the Cartagena refinery in Colombia; the job was first planned as lump sum and changed to reimbursable before signing. EPC costs grew from a December 2011 forecast of US$3.971 billion, which CB&I's project director had called a Class I estimate (±5%), to US$5.9 billion, and mechanical completion came 725 days after the guaranteed date. On 7 June 2023 an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) tribunal ordered CB&I to pay more than US$1 billion, including US$845.4 million for breaking its promise to control costs "similar to a lump sum contract", and set aside the contract's liability cap for gross negligence.
Lessona reimbursable contract still puts overruns on the contractor if it promises lump-sum-like cost control and fails to deliver it.
Credit
Reficar (claimant); the ICC tribunal
2025
A partner's debts come due
Partners in a contractor joint venture often sign "jointly and severally", so each can be made to pay the whole of the venture's debts. Petrofac, Saipem and Samsung E&A worked together in an unsuccessful joint venture on an oil facility in Thailand, which left the partners with disputed joint and several liabilities of about US$1.67 billion. Petrofac then asked the court to approve plans writing off its existing debts, about US$909 million secured and perhaps US$3 billion unsecured. Saipem and Samsung objected, and on 1 July 2025 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales set the plans aside, finding that they gave too large a share of the benefit to the lenders of new money. After the Dutch grid operator TenneT ended Petrofac's work on its 2 GW program, Petrofac's holding company went into administration on 28 October 2025.
Lessonin a joint venture, a weak partner's share of a loss can land on the strong ones.
Credit
Saipem and Samsung E&A (appellants); Court of Appeal
Watch for
Lump sum returns to LNG
Woodside Energy approved its Louisiana LNG plant, three trains (processing lines) making 16.5 million tonnes a year, with an estimate of US$17.5 billion. It said 95% of its EPC spending was lump sum or fixed rates at the investment decision, and that "Bechtel is one of the few contractors that will stand behind their lump sum turnkey contracts which guarantees price, schedule, and performance." In February 2026 Woodside reported the project 22% complete at the end of 2025 and on target for first LNG in 2029.
Achieved whenthe three trains reach commercial operation with the contract price changed only by disclosed change orders, as shown in Woodside's audited reports.
Claimed by
Woodside Energy, April 2025
Open
01
Guarantees running out
An open table, quarter by quarter from 2012, of each large listed EPC contractor's letters of credit and surety bonds outstanding against the facilities it has, set beside its backlog of signed work. Then a back-test of whether that headroom shrank before the known collapses and rescues, such as Chiyoda (2019), McDermott (2020) and Petrofac (2025). A letter of credit is a bank's guarantee that the owner can draw on if the contractor fails, and owners ask for one before paying advances.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
How a lump sum moves
A table of every change order filed with the SEC for US LNG lump-sum contracts, giving each order's date, cause, amount where shown, and the running contract price. A change order is a signed amendment that changes the work, the price or the dates.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Guarantees running out
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
An open table, quarter by quarter from 2012, of each large listed EPC contractor's letters of credit and surety bonds outstanding against the facilities it has, set beside its backlog of signed work. Then a back-test of whether that headroom shrank before the known collapses and rescues, such as Chiyoda (2019), McDermott (2020) and Petrofac (2025). A letter of credit is a bank's guarantee that the owner can draw on if the contractor fails, and owners ask for one before paying advances.
Why it is still open
McDermott's 2020 disclosure statement says it had reached the limit of its letter-of-credit capacity while its backlog exceeded US$19 billion, so it could not take on the work it had won. Published default models for construction firms, such as Tserng and others (2014), score 21 financial ratios plus a market factor, not guarantee headroom against backlog, and no study found tests that measure on EPC contractors.
Built with what exists
SEC EDGAR filings and their XBRL data for US-listed contractors such as Fluor, KBR and McDermott; annual and half-year reports for Petrofac, Saipem, Chiyoda and JGC, and Korea's DART filing system for Samsung E&A and Hyundai E&C; pdfplumber and pandas; an AI model to pull the figures from notes to the accounts, with every figure checked by hand.
First step
Pull McDermott's letter-of-credit facilities and usage from its 10-K and 10-Q filings for 2017 to 2019 and chart them against its backlog.
Done looks like
At least 12 contractors from 2012 to 2025, every figure tied to a page in a filing, and a published back-test giving, for each failure or rescue, how many quarters ahead the headroom crossed a threshold set on the other firms, with the number of false alarms.
Open 02 · the brief
How a lump sum moves
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A table of every change order filed with the SEC for US LNG lump-sum contracts, giving each order's date, cause, amount where shown, and the running contract price. A change order is a signed amendment that changes the work, the price or the dates.
Why it is still open
The orders are filed one exhibit at a time. For Corpus Christi Stage 3, built by Bechtel, each order restates the running price: an original US$5,484,000,000, and US$349,945,970 more after the first 92 orders, for causes from currency conversion and commodity price indexing to insurance and extra tanks. Cheniere's 2025 annual report puts the contract at about US$6.0 billion including change orders and lists more than 100 of them by number. A search found no study that classifies them by cause.
Built with what exists
The EDGAR full-text search and archive, Python with an HTML parser, an AI model for a first pass at coding causes, and two human coders.
First step
Tabulate the Corpus Christi Stage 3 change orders listed in Cheniere Corpus Christi Holdings' 2025 annual report, starting from CO-00001.
Done looks like
All filed change orders for at least three contracts (for example Corpus Christi Stage 3, Sabine Pass Trains 1 and 2, and Driftwood Phase 1), each coded by cause by two coders who agree on at least 90%, with running totals that match the price stated in each order and a count of redacted amounts.