Industries / Transport and vehicles / Aerospace and defense / Defense contracting
Cost and schedule control
Cost and schedule control is how defense programs estimate what they will cost and how long they will take, track progress against those plans, and report overruns.
7
Milestones achieved, from 1936 to 2012.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1936
Cost falls with practice
T. P. Wright published "Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes" in the Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences in February 1936. The idea now called the learning curve is that cost falls by a steady share each time the number built doubles. GAO's cost-estimating guide works an example of an 80% curve, where a second unit costs 80% of the first and a fourth 80% of the second. A 2013 test on 62 technologies by Béla Nagy, J. Doyne Farmer, Quan Bui and Jessika Trancik found that Wright's rule gave the best forecasts of the six they compared.
Credit
T. P. Wright
1959
Plans drawn as networks
For the Polaris missile-submarine program, the US Navy's Special Projects Office and the consulting firm Booz, Allen and Hamilton built PERT, a method that draws a research program as a network of events linked by activities and turns the time estimates of the people doing the work into probabilities. D. G. Malcolm, J. H. Roseboom and C. E. Clark of Booz Allen and W. Fazar of the Navy described it in Operations Research in October 1959, including the difficulties of putting it into use.
Credit
US Navy Special Projects Office; Booz, Allen and Hamilton
1982
Overruns reported to Congress
A US law of 8 September 1982 made DOD report to Congress when a major program's unit cost grows past set limits, called a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Today a "significant" breach is growth of 15% over the current baseline or 30% over the original, and a "critical" breach is 25% or 50%. Since a 2009 reform law, a program with a critical breach is terminated unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress, after a root-cause analysis, that it should go on.
Credit
US Congress
1991
Warnings in the data
The US Navy's A-12 carrier aircraft was developed by General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas under a fixed-price contract. An inquiry by Navy Deputy General Counsel Chester Paul Beach found that the contractors had seen "increasing cost and schedule variances", gaps between planned and actual progress, without alerting the Navy in time, and a Pentagon analyst, Gary Christle, had concluded the program was US$1 billion over budget and a year late. Investigations by Beach and by the DOD Inspector General found that top officials knew of the problems. The Navy canceled the contract on 7 January 1991.
LessonCost and schedule reports help only if someone with authority acts on them.
Credit
Chester Paul Beach (inquiry); DOD Inspector General
1998
One standard for earned value
Earned value management compares the work actually done with the work planned and the money spent, so that slips and overruns show up early. In 1998 the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) set a national standard for earned value systems, now 32 guidelines in EIA-748, revised as EIA-748-D in January 2019. The US Office of Management and Budget required earned value on all major federal capital purchases in 2006.
Credit
ANSI; EIA
2009
Delay has a price
A review of UK defense acquisition by Bernard Gray found that equipment projects ran on average five years late and put the cost to the MOD of these delays at £900 million to £2.2 billion a year, against equipment spending of about £6 billion a year. Gray proposed a fully costed defense review in each parliament and ten-year equipment budgets published to Parliament.
LessonPushing projects back to fit one year's budget raises what they cost in total.
Credit
Bernard Gray
2012
An auditor checks the plan
From 2012 to 2023 the UK's National Audit Office (NAO) published an independent assessment of the MOD's ten-year Equipment Plan every year. In 2023 the MOD acknowledged that the plan was unaffordable, with its projects expected to cost £16.9 billion more than the budget.
Credit
National Audit Office
Watch for
A fully funded UK plan
The MOD's Defence Investment Plan replaces the ten-year Equipment Plan. It was due by autumn 2025 and, the NAO says, had still not been published in May 2026. By October 2026 the government was calling it "fully funded", backed by £298 billion over the next four years.
Achieved whenthe NAO's planned assessment finds that the plan's commitments can be delivered within its forecast budgets.
Claimed by
UK government, October 2026
Open
01
Overruns in defense business systems
One table, across countries, of the planned and latest cost and finish dates of defense business systems (software for finance, pay, logistics and enterprise resource planning, or ERP), taken from audit-office reports, with a range of likely overrun that a planner can apply to a new project.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Check multiyear savings claims
A check of the savings DOD promised Congress when it bought non-weapon equipment, such as transport aircraft and trucks, on multiyear contracts (one contract covering several years' quantities), against the prices it later paid.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Overruns in defense business systems
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
One table, across countries, of the planned and latest cost and finish dates of defense business systems (software for finance, pay, logistics and enterprise resource planning, or ERP), taken from audit-office reports, with a range of likely overrun that a planner can apply to a new project.
Why it is still open
Audit offices report these projects one at a time. GAO, for example, has listed DOD business systems modernization as high-risk and found in 2008 that the Navy's ERP program was more than two years late and almost US$600 million over. Bent Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier and colleagues at Oxford have built large sets of project overruns and have written on IT project risk, but they say their sources often insist on non-disclosure agreements, so the project-level rows are not public. Searches in this session found no public compiled set for defense business systems across countries.
Built with what exists
Report PDFs from GAO, the NAO, the Australian National Audit Office and the Office of the Auditor General of Canada; pdftotext; a language model such as Claude to pull baseline and latest figures with page references, checked by hand (see the Note "Seven more flagged"); pandas.
First step
List the DOD business systems named in GAO reports since 2005 and fill the first ten rows.
Done looks like
At least 40 systems from at least three countries, each row with baseline and latest cost and dates and a page-cited source; a second person re-checks 20 rows with no disagreement on figures; the published median and 80th-percentile cost growth.
Open 02 · the brief
Check multiyear savings claims
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A check of the savings DOD promised Congress when it bought non-weapon equipment, such as transport aircraft and trucks, on multiyear contracts (one contract covering several years' quantities), against the prices it later paid.
Why it is still open
GAO found in 2008 that DOD does not track multiyear results against original expectations and makes little effort to check whether savings were achieved. A March 2025 Congressional Research Service report says DOD has no formal way to track them and that actual savings are hard to observe or verify.
Built with what exists
DOD budget justification books from the DOD Comptroller's website (procurement exhibits with unit costs, and the exhibits that justify multiyear savings); pdftotext and pdfplumber; Python; the learning-curve method in GAO's cost guide to estimate what yearly buying would have cost.
First step
Take the list of multiyear contracts in the Congressional Research Service report, mark the non-weapon ones, and download their savings exhibits.
Done looks like
For at least six multiyear contracts for non-weapon items, a table of savings promised at approval against savings estimated from later unit prices, with method and code published, and one case compared with the Institute for Defense Analyses' 2013 study that the Congressional Research Service cites.