BRENNEN

Industries / Transport and vehicles / Aviation

Safety

This is the work of finding and removing the causes of accidents across the whole air transport system, through independent investigation, flight recorders, confidential reporting, warning systems, crew training and the rules that tie them together.

7

Milestones achieved, from 1960 to 2026.

2

To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.

2

Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.

The road

AchievedWatch forOpen

Achieved

  1. 1960

    Recorders made compulsory

    David Warren, a scientist at Australia's Aeronautical Research Laboratory in Melbourne, thought of a cockpit recorder in 1953, while the Comet, the first jet airliner, was suffering a series of unexplained crashes. His team built a demonstration model in 1957, which Britain took up for further development. After an unexplained Fokker Friendship crash at Mackay in 1960, the court of inquiry ordered recorders fitted to all future Australian aircraft. Australia's Defence Science and Technology Group, which credits Warren with the world's first black box, says this made Australia the first country to require cockpit voice recording.

    dst.defence.gov.au

    Credit

    David Warren, with Kenneth Fraser, Lane Sear and Walter Boswell, Aeronautical Research Laboratory

  2. 1974

    Investigators made independent

    In the United States, accident investigation moved from the Commerce Department (1926) to the Civil Aeronautics Board (1940), then to a new National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) inside the Department of Transportation in 1967. In 1974 Congress made the NTSB a separate agency, reasoning that investigators must be "totally separate and independent" from other agencies, because the transport department's own rules and operations may be part of what failed. ICAO's Annex 13, the world standard for investigations, states that their "sole objective" is to prevent accidents and that "it is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability." The NTSB says 82% of the more than 13,000 recommendations it has closed were carried out.

    ntsb.govicao.int

    Credit

    US Congress; the NTSB; ICAO

  3. 1975

    Terrain alarms and safe reporting

    On 1 December 1974 TWA Flight 514, a Boeing 727, descended too early in cloud on its approach to Washington Dulles and hit high ground near Mount Weather, Virginia, killing all 92 aboard. In October 1974 a United Airlines crew had a similar incident, but the lesson stayed inside United. The FAA then required a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), which sounds a voice warning when the radio altimeter shows the ground rising too fast, in all airliners by December 1975. In April 1976 the FAA and NASA set up the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), run by NASA, where pilots, controllers and mechanics report mistakes in confidence; someone who breaks a rule by accident and reports within 10 days is generally spared FAA fines and license suspension. ASRS has handled over 2.3 million reports, about 2,329 a week in 2025. The FAA credits Don Bateman, chief engineer at Honeywell's aerospace site in Redmond, Washington, with GPWS and its later GPS-and-terrain-map successor, and says they helped cut terrain crashes from one in every three million flights to fewer than one in 20 million.

    LessonThe FAA says the TWA crash might have been avoided if United's earlier incident had been shared beyond the airline.

    faa.govasrs.arc.nasa.gov

    Credit

    FAA; NASA; Don Bateman

  4. 1981

    Crews trained to speak up

    On 28 December 1978 United Airlines Flight 173, a DC-8, ran out of fuel near Portland, Oregon, killing 10 of the 189 aboard. The crew had circled for about an hour working on a landing-gear warning, and little was said about the fuel. In June 1979 NASA held a workshop with the airline industry in San Francisco, "Resource Management on the Flight Deck," on how crews share tasks, information and decisions. United began the first crew resource management (CRM) training in 1981, other airlines followed, and the FAA says CRM training has since become a regulatory requirement.

    LessonThe aircraft could still fly; it was lost because the crew's attention stayed on the gear and no one pressed the fuel problem.

    faa.govntrs.nasa.gov

    Credit

    NASA (workshop proceedings edited by G. E. Cooper, M. D. White and J. K. Lauber); United Airlines

  5. 2003

    The collision alert wins

    A traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS; ICAO calls it ACAS) listens to other aircraft's transponders and, if a collision looms, tells the two crews to climb or descend in opposite directions. On 1 July 2002 a Tupolev Tu-154M and a Boeing 757 collided over Überlingen, Germany, and all 71 people aboard died. A controller at Zurich had told the Tupolev to descend, and its crew kept descending after TCAS told them to climb. Germany's investigator, the BFU, found the TCAS rules of ICAO and of national authorities "not standardised, incomplete and partially contradictory," and in October 2002 asked ICAO to make pilots follow TCAS over any contrary controller instruction. In November 2003 ICAO amended its procedures: crews must respond immediately and follow the advice unless doing so would endanger the aircraft.

    LessonWhen a machine and a person give opposite orders, the rules must say in advance which one to obey.

    dcs.gla.ac.ukflightsafety.org

    Credit

    BFU investigation; ICAO

  6. 2015

    Safety run as a system

    A safety management system (SMS) makes an operator look for hazards, judge their risk and check that its fixes work, as a standing part of how it is run. On 8 January 2015 the FAA required every airline operating under Part 121, the US rules for larger airlines, to have one, under a new Part 5 of its regulations, and it has since extended the requirement to charter and commuter airlines, air tour operators and some manufacturers. Flight data feeds the system: under the FAA's flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) program, set out in a 2004 advisory circular, airlines analyze data recorded in flight and share de-identified totals with the FAA, which may not use them for enforcement. ICAO sets matching standards for states in Annex 19, whose second amendment, adopted in June 2025, becomes applicable on 26 November 2026.

    faa.govfaa.govfaa.govicao.int

    Credit

    FAA; ICAO

  7. 2026

    Recorders keep 25 hours

    A cockpit voice recorder records over itself in a loop, and US rules required only the last two hours. The NTSB counted 14 investigations from 2003 to 2018 in which the relevant recording had been erased this way, asked the FAA for 25 hours in 2018, and reported at least 14 more such cases by January 2024. ICAO adopted a 25-hour standard in 2016, and EASA requires it on aircraft over 27,000 kg made after 1 January 2021. In the US, the 2024 FAA Reauthorization Act required it on new airliners made from 16 May 2025 and on all covered aircraft within six years. An FAA final rule of 2 February 2026 extends it to newly made smaller aircraft.

    LessonA two-hour loop erases the evidence whenever an aircraft keeps flying or stays powered after an event.

    govinfo.gov

    Credit

    NTSB (recommendation A-18-030); ICAO; EASA; US Congress; FAA

Watch for

  1. Radar against runway incursions

    A runway incursion is any aircraft, vehicle or person wrongly on a runway. The FAA and the US Department of Transportation say 96 new surface-awareness systems were installed in the year to August 2026, that the FAA will put 53 surface movement radars at the 44 busiest US airports, and that runway incursions so far in fiscal 2026 numbered 1,102, against 1,197 in the same period a year earlier.

    Achieved whenan outside body, such as the NTSB, the Transportation Department's Inspector General or the Government Accountability Office, finds that serious incursions fell faster at airports with the new systems than at airports without them.

    foxbusiness.com

    Claimed by

    FAA and US Department of Transportation, August 2026

  2. Investigations must be finished

    ICAO's Council adopted Amendment 20 to Annex 13 in March 2026. It says the state where an accident happens must "institute, conduct, complete and publish" the investigation, that court cases do not justify holding back a final report, and that investigators must get "unrestricted and timely access" to evidence. Most changes take effect in November 2028, and the amendment carries no sanctions. The gap it targets is large: IATA counted completed reports for only 63% of 203 accidents from 2019 to 2023, and the Flight Safety Foundation found final reports for about 58% of airline accidents from 2020 to 2024.

    Achieved whenIATA's or the Flight Safety Foundation's counts show final reports published for at least 90% of accidents from 2029 on, within three years of each accident.

    dacbeachcroft.comicao.intavweb.com

    Claimed by

    ICAO, March 2026 (as summarized by the law firm DAC Beachcroft, May 2026)

Open

  1. 01

    Every investigation report, tracked

    A public table of every accident to scheduled airliners over 5,700 kg (the scope of ICAO's safety report) since 2019, listing the investigating state and the date and link of the preliminary report, each anniversary interim statement and the final report, refreshed every month.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed
  2. 02

    Unstable approaches from open data

    An open program that reads archived ADS-B tracks (the position, height and speed messages airliners broadcast) for arrivals at large airports, flags approaches that break limits set and published in advance on descent rate, speed change and late line-up with the runway in the last 1,000 feet, and posts the rate for each airport and runway every month.

    The brief
    Credit · unclaimed

Open 01 · the brief

Every investigation report, tracked

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

A public table of every accident to scheduled airliners over 5,700 kg (the scope of ICAO's safety report) since 2019, listing the investigating state and the date and link of the preliminary report, each anniversary interim statement and the final report, refreshed every month.

Why it is still open

Annex 13 asks for a final report within 12 months where possible and, failing that, an interim statement on each anniversary. IATA's figures come from its own database, and IATA says fewer than 10% comply with the interim-statement obligation. Published counts also disagree: 63% of 203 accidents completed for 2019 to 2023 in IATA's 2026 paper, 57% of 269 for 2018 to 2023 as quoted by DAC Beachcroft, and about 58% for 2020 to 2024 from the Flight Safety Foundation. A search found no public list that records interim statements accident by accident.

icao.intavweb.comdacbeachcroft.com

Built with what exists

The websites of national investigation bodies; Python; a web agent such as Browser Use 1.0 to find report pages (see the Note "Deleting 80% to start over"); an AI model such as Claude to read each document's first pages and pull out its type and date; a shared spreadsheet for human checks; GitHub to publish.

  1. First step

    Start with 2023's fatal airliner accidents, find each investigating body's pages, record the three kinds of report dates, and post the first rows with the method.

  2. Done looks like

    All 2019 to 2025 accidents in ICAO's scope listed (ICAO counted 85 in 2025 alone), a second person re-checking a random 10% of rows with at least 95% agreement, and a published comparison with IATA's 63% figure for 2019 to 2023 that explains any difference.

Open 02 · the brief

Unstable approaches from open data

Credit · unclaimed

The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.

What to build

An open program that reads archived ADS-B tracks (the position, height and speed messages airliners broadcast) for arrivals at large airports, flags approaches that break limits set and published in advance on descent rate, speed change and late line-up with the runway in the last 1,000 feet, and posts the rate for each airport and runway every month.

Why it is still open

Airlines measure this in their own flight data programs, but under the FAA's FOQA program the data stay with the airline and only de-identified totals go to the regulator. Public work with ADS-B is research only: a 2020 TU Delft master's thesis by Alberto Bonifazi applied rule-based and statistical detection to 2018 ADS-B data around Amsterdam Schiphol, and a 2025 Embry-Riddle student study scored approach stability for the university's own training flights and called itself preliminary. A search found no public table of rates by airport, kept up to date.

faa.govrepository.tudelft.nlcommons.erau.edu

Built with what exists

ADS-B archives from the OpenSky Network; traffic, an open-source Python library for air traffic data that reads OpenSky data; published runway coordinates; matplotlib for checking plots.

  1. First step

    Download one month of arrivals at one airport, plot height against distance to the runway for each, and hand-label 100 approaches as stable or not.

  2. Done looks like

    Monthly rates for at least 30 large airports for 2025, with code and limits public, and the program's flags matching a person's hand labels on at least 90% of 500 randomly chosen approaches.