Industries / Technology / Software and SaaS / Cloud and data centers / Web hosting
Security
Protecting rented websites and the accounts behind them: encrypting the connection to visitors, keeping attackers out of servers and control panels, and stopping the theft of domain names.
7
Milestones achieved, from 2003 to 2025.
2
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
2003
Many secure sites, one address
Shared hosting puts many websites on one server with one internet address. TLS (Transport Layer Security), the encryption under HTTPS, gave a browser no way to tell the server which site it wanted, so the server could not know which site's certificate to show. RFC 3546, published in June 2003, added Server Name Indication (SNI), in which the browser names the site at the start of the connection, "to facilitate secure connections to servers that host multiple 'virtual' servers at a single underlying network address".
Credit
S. Blake-Wilson (BCI), M. Nystrom (RSA Security), D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen (Transactionware) and T. Wright (Vodafone)
2015
Free certificates, renewed by software
A certificate is the file that proves to a browser that a site is what it says; it was bought from a certificate authority and installed by hand. On 14 September 2015 Let's Encrypt, run by the nonprofit Internet Security Research Group (ISRG), issued its first certificate. On 3 December 2015 it opened to everyone, after more than 26,000 certificates in a limited beta. Its certificates are free and are issued and renewed by software, through ACME, a protocol it helped create and that the IETF published as RFC 8555. By ISRG's count it issued its millionth certificate in March 2016, a million a day by September 2018, helped by Squarespace's and Shopify's integrations, and more than ten million in one day at the end of September 2025; it calls itself the world's largest certificate authority by certificates issued.
LessonISRG credits its scale to automation, certificates renewed by software without a person.
Credit
ISRG (Josh Aas, executive director)
2016
One DNS provider goes down
On 21 October 2016 attackers flooded Dyn, a company that answers DNS lookups for many large websites, with junk traffic. People had trouble reaching Twitter, Amazon, Tumblr, Reddit, Spotify, Netflix and others. The security firm Flashpoint said a botnet built with the Mirai malware, made of hacked cameras and video recorders, took part. In 2020 Aqsa Kashaf, Vyas Sekar and Yuvraj Agarwal of Carnegie Mellon University found that 89% of the 100,000 most visited websites "critically depend" on an outside DNS, content delivery or certificate provider with no backup, and that an attack on a single provider could take down about 30% of them. Comparing 2016 with 2020, they found no significant change in websites' dependence, and more concentration among DNS providers.
LessonA site that uses only one DNS provider goes down with it, and four years after Dyn the share of top sites in that position had not fallen.
Credit
Brian Krebs (reporting); Flashpoint; Kashaf, Sekar and Agarwal (measurement)
2018
Chrome flags plain HTTP
On 8 February 2018 Emily Schechter, Chrome security product manager at Google, announced that from Chrome 68, released in July 2018, Chrome would mark every HTTP site, one without encryption, as "not secure". She gave Google's figures: 68% of Chrome traffic on Android and Windows, and 78% on Chrome OS and Mac, was already protected, and 81 of the top 100 sites used HTTPS by default. In October 2025 Google wrote that the share of Chrome page loads using HTTPS rose from about 30-45% in 2015 to about 95-99% around 2020, and has since largely stopped rising.
Credit
Google's Chrome security team
2024
An expired domain fools certificates
watchTowr Labs, a security firm, found that the WHOIS server for the.mobi ending had moved to a new name, and that the old domain, dotmobiregistry.net, had been left to expire, seemingly in December 2023. It bought the domain for $20, ran a WHOIS server there from 30 August 2024, and by 4 September had received 2.5 million queries from more than 135,000 systems. Some came from certificate authorities that looked up a domain's owner by WHOIS to decide where to send a validation email; watchTowr showed that GlobalSign would treat a watchTowr address as the contact for microsoft.mobi. In November 2024 the CA/Browser Forum, the body of certificate authorities and browser makers that sets the rules for public certificates, adopted ballot SC-080 with no votes against. From 15 January 2025 authorities may not use owner contacts found through websites, and from 15 July 2025 they may not issue a certificate by contacting a domain's listed owner by email, fax, text message, post or phone at all.
LessonAn old name left to expire keeps whatever trust software still places in it, and anyone can buy that trust.
Credit
watchTowr Labs; Ryan Dickson and Chris Clements of Google's Chrome Root Program, who proposed the ballot
2024
Domains hijacked after a migration
Squarespace bought roughly 10 million domain names from Google Domains in June 2023 and moved them over gradually. Between 9 and 12 July 2024 attackers took over at least a dozen of them, mostly cryptocurrency businesses such as Compound Finance and Celer Network, and pointed some to sites that stole visitors' funds, Brian Krebs reported. Researchers at MetaMask and Paradigm said accounts that owners had not yet set up after the move could be claimed by anyone who knew the email address tied to the domain. Squarespace's post-mortem instead blamed "a weakness related to OAuth logins", sign-in through another company's account, which it fixed on 12 July, and said the move involved "no changes to multi-factor authentication". The two accounts still disagree.
LessonMoving customers between companies in bulk creates accounts their owners do not know exist, and those accounts can control the domain.
Credit
Taylor Monahan (MetaMask) and researchers at Paradigm; Squarespace
2025
Regulator orders a safer host
On 15 January 2025 the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged that GoDaddy, a hosting company with roughly five million customers, had since 2018 failed to take standard security steps for its hosting: no multi-factor sign-in, poor tracking of software updates, little logging, and shared hosting not walled off from less secure systems. It tied those failures to breaches from 2019 to 2022. They included an attacker's use of 28,000 customers' hosting logins over SSH (secure remote login) in October 2019, a 2021 breach of 1.2 million Managed WordPress customers, and malware on cPanel shared-hosting servers, found in December 2022 after customers complained their sites redirected to unknown domains. The final order, approved in May 2025, requires a security program for the hosting service, multi-factor sign-in with at least one method that needs no phone number, a review by an outside assessor every two years, and a report within 10 days of any incident in which customer data was exposed. GoDaddy said the settlement includes no admission of fault and no money penalty.
LessonA shared host's security is its customers' security; in Levine's words, millions of companies, particularly small businesses, "rely on web hosting providers like GoDaddy to secure the websites that they and their customers rely on".
Credit
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection (Samuel Levine, director)
Watch for
Chrome asks before plain HTTP
Google says that with Chrome 154, in October 2026, it will turn on "Always Use Secure Connections" for all users by default: Chrome will ask permission before first loading any public site without HTTPS. In a test on a small share of users in Chrome 141, Google says the median user saw fewer than one warning a week.
Achieved whenChrome ships with the setting on for all users and someone outside Google measures how many public sites still serve plain HTTP and how often visitors are warned.
Claimed by
Google, October 2025
Certificates that last 64 days
Let's Encrypt says that from 10 February 2027 its certificates will last 64 days by default instead of 90, unless a subscriber chooses 45 or 6 days, and that the default will drop to 45 days in 2028. This follows CA/Browser Forum ballot SC-081, adopted in April 2025 with no votes against, which cuts the longest a public certificate may last from 398 days to 200 days from 15 March 2026, 100 days from 15 March 2027 and 47 days from March 2029.
Achieved whenLet's Encrypt certificates issued after 10 February 2027 appear in public Certificate Transparency logs with 64-day lifetimes, and an outside count reports how many sites let a certificate lapse during the change.
Claimed by
Let's Encrypt (ISRG), October 2026
Open
01
Renewal records for every host
A public record of how 30 large hosts and site builders renew certificates for customers' own domain names, measured on test sites the builder owns: one site per host on its free or cheapest plan, each on its own domain, watched for a year through Certificate Transparency logs, the public record of every certificate issued. For each certificate, record its lifetime, how many days before expiry it was replaced, whether the host's software supports ARI (ACME Renewal Information, RFC 9773, by which the certificate authority tells software when to renew), and every lapse.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
A ledger of hosting breaches
An open ledger of security breaches at hosting companies and domain registrars since 2015, from public documents only: company notices, US state attorney-general filings, filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and regulators' orders. For each: what was taken, when the breach began, when it was found, when customers were told, and what the company changed afterwards.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Renewal records for every host
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public record of how 30 large hosts and site builders renew certificates for customers' own domain names, measured on test sites the builder owns: one site per host on its free or cheapest plan, each on its own domain, watched for a year through Certificate Transparency logs, the public record of every certificate issued. For each certificate, record its lifetime, how many days before expiry it was replaced, whether the host's software supports ARI (ACME Renewal Information, RFC 9773, by which the certificate authority tells software when to renew), and every lapse.
Why it is still open
Public certificates fell to 200 days on 15 March 2026 and fall to 100 days in March 2027 and 47 days in March 2029. Guidance written for hosts, such as MailChannels' July 2026 post, describes what providers should build. Researchers have measured renewal from the logs as a whole: Olamide Omolola and colleagues (PAM 2021), studying four years of Let's Encrypt certificates, found that 80% of those with a long enough history were renewed on a predictable schedule, which suggests the other 20% were renewed by hand. They grouped results by certificate authority, not by hosting company, and their data predate the shorter lifetimes. A search found vendor blogs and single hosts' own claims, but no measurement host by host.
Built with what exists
crt.sh, a free search of Certificate Transparency logs; Certbot and Let's Encrypt's staging environment for a control server the builder runs; Python; a scheduled job; a spreadsheet published as CSV.
First step
Put a test site on five hosts' free or cheapest plans this month and pull each site's certificate history from crt.sh.
Done looks like
30 hosts, 12 months of renewals for each test site, with lifetime, renewal lead time and any lapse, published as open data, covering the switch to 100-day certificates on 15 March 2027.
Open 02 · the brief
A ledger of hosting breaches
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
An open ledger of security breaches at hosting companies and domain registrars since 2015, from public documents only: company notices, US state attorney-general filings, filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and regulators' orders. For each: what was taken, when the breach began, when it was found, when customers were told, and what the company changed afterwards.
Why it is still open
A search found no dataset of hosting breaches with these dates; general breach trackers cover every sector and seldom record when a breach began. The gaps vary widely. An October 2019 intrusion using 28,000 GoDaddy customers' hosting logins was disclosed in March 2020. Web Hosting Hub's notice of 6 April 2026 described access found on 29 October 2025 and said the timing followed a law enforcement investigation. Italy's Aruba.it told customers in July 2021 of a breach dating from 23 April. The FTC's 2025 order now gives GoDaddy 10 days to report.
Built with what exists
the California attorney general's database of breach notices and other states' portals; SEC EDGAR full-text search; company status pages and notices; Python; an AI model such as Claude to pull dates out of notices, with a person checking each against the document.
First step
Search the California attorney general's breach database for notices filed by hosting companies and registrars, and log the first 15 with their dates.
Done looks like
50 incidents, each with at least three dates tied to a public document, published under an open license, with the median days from start to discovery and from discovery to customer notice.