Industries / Technology / Software and SaaS / Cloud and data centers / Web hosting
Domain names and DNS
Running the naming system that turns a site's name into the address of the server that holds it, and selling and keeping the names themselves.
7
Milestones achieved, from 1983 to 2025.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1983
Names looked up, not listed
In November 1983 Paul Mockapetris of ISI (the Information Sciences Institute) published RFC 882 and RFC 883, which set out the Domain Name System (DNS): a database spread across many servers that turns a name such as apple.com into a numeric internet address. Until then every host on the ARPA Internet was registered with the Network Information Center and listed in one shared file, HOSTS.TXT. RFC 882 said the size of that table, and how often it changed, were "near the limit of manageability".
LessonOne shared list stops working once too many hosts need changing; the answer was a database spread across many servers.
Credit
Paul Mockapetris (ISI)
1995
Domain names get a price
Names in.com,.net,.org,.edu and.gov were registered by Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) under a 1993 agreement with the US National Science Foundation (NSF), and paid for with federal money. An amendment dated 13 September 1995 let NSI charge from midnight on 14 September: $100 for a new name's first two years, then $50 a year. 70% of the money went to NSI and 30% into a fund for the internet's "Intellectual Infrastructure". NSF kept paying for.edu and.gov names for the time being.
Credit
National Science Foundation; Network Solutions
1999
Registrars compete for .com
NSI had held an exclusive right to register.com,.net and.org names. On 21 April 1999 ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a nonprofit formed in 1998 to coordinate the internet's names and numbers) named five companies to test a Shared Registry System. In it, competing registrars, the shops that sell names, all write to one registry, the operator that keeps the master list. The five were America Online, CORE, France Telecom/Oléane, Melbourne IT and register.com. The test ran from 26 April to 24 June 1999, and 29 more companies had already met ICANN's criteria to join after it.
Credit
ICANN (Esther Dyson, interim chairman; Mike Roberts, interim president); the five test registrars
2008
Rivals patch one flaw together
Dan Kaminsky of IOActive showed how to make DNS cache poisoning practical. A resolver is the server that looks up names for users; poisoning tricks it into storing a false answer, so that people typing a real site's name are sent to an attacker's server. CERT/CC, the computer emergency response team at Carnegie Mellon University, notified vendors from April 2008, and on 8 July 2008 published its note as fixes came out; the note lists 84 vendors. The main fix was source port randomization: sending each query from a randomly chosen network port, which adds about 16 bits an attacker must guess. CERT credits that idea to Daniel J. Bernstein, and said only DNSSEC (the DNS Security Extensions) could fully stop such attacks.
LessonA flaw shared by every vendor can be fixed at once when the vendors are told privately months ahead and release together.
Credit
Dan Kaminsky (IOActive); Paul Vixie (Internet Systems Consortium); Daniel J. Bernstein; CERT/CC
2017
A key change postponed
DNSSEC lets a resolver check that an answer was signed by the owner of the zone it came from. The root zone, the top of the naming tree, was first signed in July 2010. Its master key, the key signing key (KSK), was due to be replaced on 11 October 2017. In September 2017 ICANN postponed the change: new data, from resolvers reporting which keys they held, showed that many run by internet providers were not ready, and ICANN estimated that one in four internet users, 750 million people, used resolvers that check signatures and could be affected. The key was replaced in October 2018. A second replacement began on 11 October 2026 at 14:00 UTC; ICANN reported it completed as planned, while still assessing reports of issues on "a limited number of systems".
LessonBefore changing a key the whole internet depends on, measure who is ready, and wait if the numbers say so.
Credit
ICANN and IANA (the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority); Verisign, which maintains the root zone
2018
Owner records go private
WHOIS, the public directory of who holds each domain name, had shown holders' names, email addresses and phone numbers. To comply with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), enforced from 25 May 2018, ICANN's board on 17 May 2018 adopted a "Temporary Specification" for how registries and registrars publish registration data, under which personal details could be withheld. EU law then asked for accuracy as well as privacy. Article 28 of the NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555, which member states had to bring into national law by 17 October 2024, requires registries and registrars to keep accurate and complete registration data, verify it, publish the parts that are not personal, and answer lawful requests for the rest within 72 hours.
LessonHiding owner details did not end the need for them; it moved the question to who may see them, and how fast.
Credit
ICANN; the European Union
2025
WHOIS switched off
From 28 January 2025 ICANN made RDAP (the Registration Data Access Protocol) the definitive source of registration data for generic top-level domains such as.com and.org, and ended the duty to run WHOIS. RDAP, written by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), returns structured data over an encrypted web connection and can show different users different amounts of detail. Registrars and registries had offered it since 2019. A month before the switch, ICANN wrote to them that conformance with the RDAP specifications was "still very low".
LessonA replacement that has run alongside the old system for years can still be unready on the day the old one stops.
Credit
ICANN; the IETF
Watch for
A second round of endings
ICANN says 1,606 applications for new generic top-level domains are going ahead in its 2026 round, after it published the final list on 17 November 2026. 705 of them are in contention sets, groups of applications for the same or confusingly similar names, and 46 came through its Applicant Support Program. Comments and objections are open until 16 March 2027. The previous round drew 1,930 applications, revealed on 13 June 2012, and its first four names, among them the Arabic شبكة ("web/network") and the Russian сайт ("site"), entered the root zone on 23 October 2013. By the end of June 2026 names in those newer endings numbered 52.9 million of the world's 401.6 million, and.com alone held over 40%, as Domain Name Wire reported from Verisign's figures.
Achieved whenthe first top-level domain from the 2026 round appears in IANA's root zone database.
Claimed by
ICANN, November 2026
Open
01
Registrar defaults, checked by hand
A public table of the 25 largest registrars that records, for each: which second sign-in steps it offers (text message, authenticator app, security key or passkey); whether any is switched on by default for a new account; whether the owner is emailed when name servers, DNS records or contacts change, including changes made by other users on the account; whether there is an activity log; and whether registry lock, a block held at the registry that needs a manual check before any change, can be bought, and at what price. Every "yes" is confirmed on a free account the builder opens, with a dated screenshot, not copied from marketing pages.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
An RDAP scorecard by registrar
A monthly public scorecard of each registrar's RDAP service. For a fixed sample of names per registrar, send RDAP lookups at a gentle rate and record whether the server answers, how fast, whether the reply passes the basic checks ICANN listed (the "access-control-allow-origin" header that browser-based tools need, a reply that parses as RDAP under RFC 9083, an encrypted connection with a valid certificate), and whether it points to a way to request hidden data.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Registrar defaults, checked by hand
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public table of the 25 largest registrars that records, for each: which second sign-in steps it offers (text message, authenticator app, security key or passkey); whether any is switched on by default for a new account; whether the owner is emailed when name servers, DNS records or contacts change, including changes made by other users on the account; whether there is an activity log; and whether registry lock, a block held at the registry that needs a manual check before any change, can be bought, and at what price. Every "yes" is confirmed on a free account the builder opens, with a dated screenshot, not copied from marketing pages.
Why it is still open
The July 2024 hijacks of Squarespace domains turned on account defaults: researchers said migrated accounts could be claimed with an email address alone, and that owners were not told of actions taken by "domain manager" users. Squarespace blamed a weakness in sign-in through other companies' accounts. Published lists work from documentation. 2fa.directory, a community list, records which second sign-in methods 86 domain companies offer, with a link to each one's help page; DomainDetails' table (updated 21 March 2026) lists whether a handful of registrars offer two-factor sign-in and registry lock. A search found none that records what is on by default or whether owners are alerted, tested on real accounts.
Built with what exists
ICANN's public list of accredited registrars and its monthly registry reports, which count names by registrar; Browser Use, an open-source agent that drives a web browser (see the Note "Deleting 80% to start over"), or Playwright, to walk through settings pages and take screenshots on the builder's own accounts; a spreadsheet published as CSV.
First step
Open free accounts at five large registrars and record, before touching any setting, which second sign-in steps are offered and whether any is already on.
Done looks like
25 registrars, eight fields each, every cell backed by a dated screenshot or a linked help page, published as open data; the whole table re-checked after six months, with every change listed.
Open 02 · the brief
An RDAP scorecard by registrar
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A monthly public scorecard of each registrar's RDAP service. For a fixed sample of names per registrar, send RDAP lookups at a gentle rate and record whether the server answers, how fast, whether the reply passes the basic checks ICANN listed (the "access-control-allow-origin" header that browser-based tools need, a reply that parses as RDAP under RFC 9083, an encrypted connection with a valid certificate), and whether it points to a way to request hidden data.
Why it is still open
RDAP replaced WHOIS for generic top-level domains on 28 January 2025. In December 2024 ICANN told registries and registrars that conformance was "still very low" and listed these checks. ICANN's compliance team opens cases one registrar at a time, and on 12 January 2026 terminated the accreditation of the registrar Brennercom, effective 28 January, for uncured breaches, the first of them having no RDAP service. WhoisXML API's free TLD RDAP Monitor, launched in September 2025, checks every 48 hours which of 1,440 top-level domains run RDAP, but it grades endings, not registrars, and does not test replies against ICANN's profile. No public results by registrar were found. The one large timing study found, by ICANN's Carlos Gañán at the TMA 2021 conference, timed more than 10 million queries to 533 RDAP services before the switch, and found 95% answered within 3 seconds; it did not grade conformance.
Built with what exists
ICANN's open-source icann-rdap command-line client and its lookup service at lookup.icann.org; IANA's RDAP bootstrap file, which says which server answers for each ending; zone files from ICANN's Centralized Zone Data Service to pick sample names; Python; curl; a scheduled job.
First step
Run the icann-rdap client against 20 names at each of ten registrars and log which replies lack the "access-control-allow-origin" header.
Done looks like
The 100 largest registrars scored every month for six months, each failure published with the raw reply and the code; each registrar with a failure told of it, and the number fixed by the next run counted.