Industries / Industrial equipment and services / Industrial services / Process safety consulting
Managing changes
Managing change means reviewing a change to equipment, chemicals, procedures or staffing for new hazards before the change is made.
5
Milestones achieved, from 1990 to 2017.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
1990
Changes put under review
API RP 750, Management of Process Hazards, is dated 1 January 1990. It was written for refineries, petrochemical plants and large oil and gas plants, and its Section 4 covers management of change: the types of change and how to manage them. Henry Ozog and R. Peter Stickles of Arthur D. Little wrote in Oil & Gas Journal in January 1991 that it "for the first time defines a framework" for managing risk in oil and gas operations, and that it shares a common origin with OSHA's proposed rule. OSHA's 1992 standard then made written change procedures law at covered US plants: every change other than a "replacement in kind" must address its technical basis, its effect on safety and health, changes to operating procedures, the time it needs and who must authorize it. API later withdrew RP 750 without a replacement.
Credit
American Petroleum Institute; US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
2003
Reorganizations count as changes
In June 2003 the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published guidance on organisational change at major hazard sites, covering changes such as delayering, outsourcing, downsizing and changes to key personnel. HSE wrote that such changes are often "not analysed and controlled as thoroughly as plant changes," and set out three steps: get organised, assess the risks, then carry out and monitor the change. Its example was Hickson & Welch in Castleford, where fires killed five employees in 1992: after a reorganisation, inexperienced team leaders reporting to an overworked area manager had organised the vessel cleaning.
LessonA cut in staff or supervision needs the same hazard review as a new pipe.
Credit
UK Health and Safety Executive
2007
A pipe left behind
On 16 February 2007 propane escaped from a cracked elbow at Valero's McKee refinery in Sunray, Texas. US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigators estimated the initial rate at 4,500 pounds per minute, and the fire that followed injured four workers and shut the refinery for two months. The elbow belonged to a control station that had probably been out of service since the early 1990s but was still connected to the process, making it a "dead leg," a section of pipe with no flow through it. Water leaked past a valve, collected and froze. The CSB found that the refinery had not identified the hazards when the dead leg was created, and asked Valero to set up written freeze protection programs covering identification, management of change and audits. Valero put a corporate procedure for inspecting dead legs in place at all its US refineries, and the CSB closed the recommendation on 24 March 2017.
LessonTaking equipment out of service is a change and needs its own review.
Credit
US Chemical Safety Board
2013
A review after the fact
In 2001 Williams fitted new valves to the reboilers of its olefins plant in Geismar, Louisiana, so that one reboiler could be kept offline. The valves could also cut a reboiler off from its relief valve. The CSB found that the pre-startup review was done on 1 February 2001, but the change review was not opened until 2 March and was approved on 6 April, after the plant was already running with the valves. On 13 June 2013 an isolated reboiler was put back into use, overpressured and ruptured, and two workers died; in all, 167 people reported injuries. The CSB quoted guidance published in 2008 by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS): "Site management should not tolerate the startup of a change prior to obtaining the necessary authorizations."
LessonA change review filed after the change is paperwork, not a review.
Credit
US Chemical Safety Board
2017
Inspectors list missed changes
OSHA's 2017 lessons from its refinery inspection program put management of change among the five areas of its process safety standard that drew the most citations. Its examples of changes made with no review include fitting a control valve bypass, changing an alarm set point and changing materials of construction, and it lists temporary changes left in place too long.
Credit
OSHA
Watch for
AI cross-links plant records
David Parham of uc2c.ai describes large language models guided by a process safety ontology, a fixed vocabulary of plant terms and how they relate. The system pulls evidence from P&IDs, asset registers, hazard analyses, change records and incident reports, flags where the sources disagree, and traces every answer to its evidence. It is a case study by the developer.
Achieved whensomeone outside the company runs it on one plant's records and publishes how many discrepancies it found and how many it missed.
Claimed by
David Parham, uc2c.ai, at FOPAM 2026, July 2026
Open
01
A dead-leg finder
A program that reads a plant's P&IDs and lists every dead leg it finds (branches behind valves kept closed, bypasses, spare pumps that do not run, drains and obsolete lines), marks the low points where water can collect, and compares the list with the site's own register of dead legs.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Bad changes as a test
A public set of 40 changes that led to accidents, each written as the change request that was filed, or would have been filed, before the work, together with the hazard investigators later found. Any AI change reviewer can then be scored on whether it raises that hazard.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
A dead-leg finder
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A program that reads a plant's P&IDs and lists every dead leg it finds (branches behind valves kept closed, bypasses, spare pumps that do not run, drains and obsolete lines), marks the low points where water can collect, and compares the list with the site's own register of dead legs.
Why it is still open
At McKee, people did the review of out-of-service piping, in a refinery that "did not review units to identify dead-legs," and the fix Valero adopted was an inspection procedure. A February 2022 CCPS safety bulletin sorts dead legs into types that people spot by eye, and Cenosco, which sells inspection software, described the identification steps in February 2026 as people reviewing P&IDs and isometric drawings, then walking the site to find the ones the drawings missed. Rule-based checking of P&ID graphs has been shown for drawing errors (33 rules, five of them demonstrated) but not for dead legs, and no published tool was found in November 2026.
Built with what exists
pyDEXPI, TU Delft's Python package that turns P&IDs in DEXPI, the open exchange format for plant drawings, into graphs; NetworkX subgraph matching, as used in the Delft paper; and, for scanned drawings, the public P&ID graph benchmark of Stürmer and colleagues.
First step
Write the rule for a branch behind a closed valve, run it on one DEXPI example P&ID, and compare the result with a count made by hand.
Done looks like
On 10 public P&IDs where two piping engineers have marked the dead legs separately, the tool finds at least 90% of them with no more than one false flag per sheet.
Open 02 · the brief
Bad changes as a test
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public set of 40 changes that led to accidents, each written as the change request that was filed, or would have been filed, before the work, together with the hazard investigators later found. Any AI change reviewer can then be scored on whether it raises that hazard.
Why it is still open
The closest published work is a single developer's case study from July 2026, which reports no counts. OSHA's citations show which kinds of change get missed (bypasses, set points, materials), but nobody has published a test that scores reviewers on them.
Built with what exists
Public CSB reports such as McKee and Williams Geismar; OSHA's cited examples; current large language models as the reviewers under test, set up to cite the page behind each flag (Notes: "Findings that cite notes"; "Seven more flagged").
First step
Write the Williams 2001 valve change and the McKee control station shutdown as change requests and test one model on them.
Done looks like
40 cases released under an open licence, with scores for at least three tools. A tool passes if it names the investigators' hazard in at least 30 of the 40 and reviewers judge no more than 20% of its other flags irrelevant.