Industries / Technology / Crypto and blockchain
Wallets and custody
This is the work of holding the secret keys that control coins, whether owners keep them on their own devices or a firm holds them for customers.
5
Milestones achieved, from 2013 to 2025.
1
To watch for: announced, not yet confirmed outside.
2
Open deliverables. Nobody has shipped them.
The road
AchievedWatch forOpen
Achieved
2013
Words that back up wallets
Pieter Wuille's BIP 32 (2012) set out "a system for deriving a tree of keypairs from a single seed", so that one backup covers every address a wallet makes. BIP 39 (2013), by Marek Palatinus, Pavol Rusnak, Aaron Voisine and Sean Bowe, turned the seed into "a group of easy to remember words" that a person can write on paper. Both are marked "Deployed" in Bitcoin's register of proposals.
Credit
as named
2014
Keys off the computer
On 29 July 2014 SatoshiLabs launched the Trezor Model One, a small single-purpose device that keeps private keys, the secret numbers that control coins, apart from the computer connected to the internet. The company says it introduced "the concept of a hardware wallet to the world".
Credit
Marek Palatinus and Pavol Rusnák, SatoshiLabs
2019
One man held everything
QuadrigaCX, a Canadian exchange, collapsed after it announced on 14 January 2019 that its co-founder Gerald Cotten had died. Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission found that most of the $169 million shortfall came not from keys lost at his death but from fraud: he opened accounts under aliases, credited himself with fictitious balances and covered his losses with other clients' deposits, so that "Quadriga operated like a Ponzi scheme".
LessonClients could not see that one person controlled both the coins and the books.
Credit
Ontario Securities Commission staff (April 2020)
2025
Custody accounting rule withdrawn
On 23 January 2025 SEC staff issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 122, rescinding the 2022 guidance on "Accounting for Obligations to Safeguard Crypto-Assets an Entity Holds for its Platform Users". Firms that hold crypto for customers now decide whether to record a liability under the ordinary accounting standards for possible losses.
Credit
US Securities and Exchange Commission staff
2025
Signers approve a theft
On or about 21 February 2025 about $1.5 billion in virtual assets was taken from the exchange Bybit. The FBI attributed it to North Korean actors it calls "TraderTraitor" and asked exchanges, bridges and analytics firms to block the laundering addresses. The Ethereum Foundation later named it among the losses caused by blind signing, approving "a confirmation the user cannot meaningfully understand".
LessonA cold wallet, kept offline, is only as safe as the screen its signers trust.
Credit
FBI (attribution)
Watch for
Wallets that show intent
On 12 May 2026 a working group of wallet makers, security firms and the Ethereum Foundation's Trillion Dollar Security Initiative launched Clear Signing: a shared format (ERC-7730) for describing in plain words what a contract call does, a registry to distribute the descriptions, and independent reviews and attestations of them. Ledger began the format; contributors include Trezor, MetaMask, WalletConnect and Fireblocks. Trezor turned it on in September 2026 for named apps such as Aave, Lido and 1inch, and for any other contract "your Trezor will fall back to the standard blind-signing warning".
Achieved whenan outside test shows the major wallets displaying the true action for most widely used contracts.
Claimed by
Ethereum Foundation, May 2026; Trezor, September 2026
Open
01
Signing screens put to test
A public set of 50 test-network transactions, each modelled on a known attack: a multi-signature wallet upgrade like the one behind the Bybit theft, unlimited token approvals, off-chain "permit" signatures and account delegations. Sign each on 10 hardware wallets and 10 software wallets, film what every screen shows, and have two raters score whether a careful user could tell what the transaction does.
The briefCredit · unclaimed02
Lookalike address warnings, tested
In address poisoning, an attacker sends a worthless transfer from an address whose first and last characters match one the victim uses, hoping the victim later copies it from their history. Recreate the common patterns on test networks and record, in 20 wallets, whether the fake appears in the history and in address suggestions, and whether the wallet warns.
The briefCredit · unclaimed
Open 01 · the brief
Signing screens put to test
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
A public set of 50 test-network transactions, each modelled on a known attack: a multi-signature wallet upgrade like the one behind the Bybit theft, unlimited token approvals, off-chain "permit" signatures and account delegations. Sign each on 10 hardware wallets and 10 software wallets, film what every screen shows, and have two raters score whether a careful user could tell what the transaction does.
Why it is still open
The Ethereum Foundation's Clear Signing launch gives no count of wallets or contracts covered and no measure of adoption, and Trezor's version falls back to a blind-signing warning for contracts it does not support. This research found no published test of many wallets against the same transactions.
Built with what exists
The Sepolia test network and faucet ether, so no real money moves; Foundry for building transactions; Safe multi-signature contracts deployed on Sepolia; ERC-7730 descriptions from clearsigning.org; a camera; a written scoring rubric.
First step
Write the first 10 test transactions and record what two hardware wallets show for each.
Done looks like
1,000 filmed signings (50 transactions on 20 wallets), each scored by two raters with at least 90% agreement, the table and videos published, and a rerun six months later to show what changed.
Open 02 · the brief
Lookalike address warnings, tested
The first to publish is credited on this line, and the deliverable moves from Open to Achieved.
What to build
In address poisoning, an attacker sends a worthless transfer from an address whose first and last characters match one the victim uses, hoping the victim later copies it from their history. Recreate the common patterns on test networks and record, in 20 wallets, whether the fake appears in the history and in address suggestions, and whether the wallet warns.
Why it is still open
Taro Tsuchiya, Jin-Dong Dong, Kyle Soska and Nicolas Christin counted about 270 million poisoning attempts against 17 million victims on Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain from July 2022 to June 2024, with at least $83.8 million lost. Carnegie Mellon's account of the study notes that most wallets show only the first and last few characters of an address and that "wallet providers are cautious about filtering small transactions". This research found no published test of how wallets handle it.
Built with what exists
Sepolia and the BNB Smart Chain test network; Foundry's cast wallet vanity command to make addresses with matching ends; test tokens; screenshots and a fixed checklist.
First step
Make one lookalike of a test account, send it a zero-value token transfer on Sepolia, and see how three wallets display it.
Done looks like
20 wallets tested against five poisoning patterns, each result (shown, hidden or warned) in a public table with screenshots, repeated after six months.